Accidentes en la Aviación Civil

[koinorr]

Lo deje de seguir de lo mucho que le erraba el muchacho este. Le tome idea.

Estoy viendo el del coreano que amuró

 

[spirit666]

Lo deje de seguir de lo mucho que le erraba el muchacho este. Le tome idea.

En estos días se han visto y leído cada cosas referidas al accidente que han dejado a muchos off-side. Lo más inédito que leí hasta ahora que el software del avión accidentado se cargo en el 787 el día 01/11/2011 y que "había demasiados unos y ceros" lo que podía haber provocado un fallo en el software....

Pero lo de la retracción del asiento por lejos es lo más bizarro...

 

[nico22]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1935062405853364689

 

[Bf 109]

Me mata la foto con los pilotos en las sillas Colombraro, especialmente porque estas si se vencen y te vas de espalda

Tengo varias en mi haber. Creo que ya pasé la cantidad para.ser considerado as.

 

[spirit666]

Aunque no se referencia de modo directo con la pérdida del 787 de Air India, hoy la oficina de investigación de accidentes aeronáuticos de India (AAIB) hizo mención a que está revisando otro incidente provocado por la pérdida de potencia en dos motores de modo simultáneo en un hecho sucedido en el año 2020 con un Airbus A321 de Titan Airways por combustible contaminado. En dicha oportunidad al despegar el A321 sufrió pérdida de potencia en el motor izquierdo y luego en el derecho afectando también el funcionamiento de la APU. La aeronave pudo aterrizar sin problemas ya que había alcanzado 4500 pies antes de tener los problemas en los motores.

Se descubrió que el combustible tenía exceso de biocida, un aditivo que se utiliza para controlar los microbios en los depósitos y filtros de combustible. En este caso se había utilizado una cantidad excesiva y no debidamente diluída del biocida que afectó la normal combustibilidad del Jet A.

Por el momento sería el único antecedente que provocó en una aeronave la pérdida de potencia de ambos motores y de la APU.

 

[cosmiccomet74]

Un accidente que sucedio en el 2010 debido a contaminación de combustible donde cargan combustible en Indonesia con destino a Hong Kong.

The Aviation Herald

Aviation Herald - News, Incidents and Accidents in Aviation

avherald.com

Accident: Cathay A333 at Hong Kong on Apr 13th 2010, engine stuck at high thrust

By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Sep 4th 2013 15:40Z, last updated Wednesday, Sep 4th 2013 15:40Z Hong Kong's Civil Aviation Department (CAD) released their final report concluding the probable cause of the accident was: The accident was caused by fuel contamination. The contaminated fuel, which contained SAP (Super Absorbent Polymer) spheres, uplifted at WARR (Surabaya) subsequently caused the loss of thrust control on both engines of the aircraft during approach to VHHH (Hong Kong). The following chain of events and circumstances had led to the uplift of contaminated fuel to CPA780: - The re-commissioning of the hydrant refuelling system after the hydrant extension work in WARR had not completely removed all contaminants in the affected hydrant refuelling circuit. Salt water remained in the affected hydrant refuelling circuit. - The re-commissioning of the hydrant refuelling system after the hydrant extension work in WARR was not properly coordinated which led to the premature resumption of the hydrant refuelling operations while the hydrant system still contained contaminant. - The refuelling operation in WARR, in particular low flow-rate refuelling, DP recording and monitoring, did not fully comply with the international fuel industry latest guidance. - A number of unscheduled filter monitors replacements after the premature resumption of hydrant refuelling operation were not investigated by the fuel supplier and hydrant operator at WARR. - The unusual vibration observed during the refuelling of CPA780 was not stopped immediately and properly investigated by the fuel supplier personnel. The investigation also identified the following deficiencies and contributing factors that may cause possible fuel contamination: - There were no established international civil aviation requirements for oversight and quality control on aviation fuel supply at airports. - There were no established international civil aviation requirements for refuel operational procedures and associated training for aviation fuel supply personnel. - The manual monitoring of DP changes in a fuelling dispenser during refuelling was not effective. The CAD analyzed that following the indication that both engines had stalled about 45nm from the aerodrome the aircraft was left with insufficient power to reach Hong Kong Airport until the crew worked the all engines flame out checklist, which resulted in the left hand engine's thrust to increase sufficiently to be able to reach Hong Kong. The CAD wrote: "On descent to FL230 at 0519 hrs, the flight crew received the ECAM messages of “ENG 1 CTL SYS FAULT” and “ENG 2 STALL” within a short period of time. The flight crew handled the abnormal situation in accordance with the Airbus and the company procedures for the A330 aircraft. The crew appropriately declared a “PAN” call to ATC and also briefed the cabin crew of the situation. The abnormal landing to VHHH was planned in accordance with the company procedures. At 0530 hrs, when the aircraft was approximately 45 nm southeast of VHHH, the ECAM message “ENG 1 STALL” annunciated. This became an emergency situation and the workload in the cockpit had understandably increased significantly. The crew again handled the emergency situation in accordance with the Airbus and the company procedures for the A330. They also appropriately declared a “MAYDAY” to ATC. Owing to the control problem of the engine thrust and the limited power produced by the engines during descent, the flight crew had attempted to clear the faults from No. 2 engine by conducting the “ALL ENG FLAME OUT – FUEL REMAINING” checklist. This crew action is considered reasonable under the circumstances as that checklist provides the necessary procedures for restarting the engine(s) and also provides information on configuring the aircraft for an emergency landing should the engines fail. After the N1 of No. 1 engine had increased, it became apparent to the flight crew that CPA780 could reach VHHH for an emergency landing." The CAD went on to write: "During the visual approach to Runway 07L, the Commander manoeuvred the aircraft in order to manage altitude and airspeed. It was not until the aircraft on the final descent for landing that the Commander realised they could not reduce the thrust on the number 1 engine. The speed was not controllable and from that point, there was no time for the crew to consider other strategy nor procedure to cope with such emergency situation. The Commander operated the aircraft as close as possible to VLS for landing at whatever configuration they could achieve. High drag devices such as speedbrakes and landing gears were deployed. However, due to the high thrust from the No. 1 engine, it was clear to the Commander that they would be landing at high speed, and he manoeuvred the aircraft visually as required to achieve a touchdown as close as possible to the normal touchdown zone. The crew did not inform ATC of the abnormal high speed landing, very likely due to high workload and limited time available. At the time of the landing there was a crosswind of about 13 kt from the right. The aircraft touched down at about 231 kt (the configuration full approach speed with landing weight of 173,600 kg was 135 kt), and at a position between abeam Taxiways A4 and A5 and with a distance of around 680 metres from the beginning of the runway threshold, and bounced. The aircraft rolled left to seven degrees and pitched down to -2.5 degrees at second touchdown. Eventually the lower cowling of No. 1 engine contacted the runway surface. The very high speed landing combined with the strong wind could have led to the bounce of the aircraft after landing. This, combined with the necessary directional control of the aircraft, could have subsequently caused the lower cowling of No. 1 engine contacting the runway. Although the autobrake remained at “LO” (i.e. the lowest autobrake setting) due to time constraint and workload, the Commander applied full manual braking force after the touchdown. As a result of the high landing speed and abnormal landing configurations, the aircraft came to a stop near the runway centreline in the vicinity of the threshold area of the opposite Runway 25R, about 309m from the end of the landing Runway 07L. Landing distance for such abnormal configurations and speed was not provided, nor was it required to be provided, by the Airbus or the CPA documentations. The heat generated from the high energy braking also caused the thermal relief plug to deflate three of the left main gear tyres and two of the right main gear tyres, and the subsequent hot brakes and fire observed by the AFC." The CAD further analysed that after bringing the aircraft to a stop the crew worked the evacuation checklist until the point where the decision whether to commence evacuation or not was to be made. The crew inquired with tower whether fire or smoke was visible, the tower replied in the negative and instructed the crew to switch to the fire chief's frequency, the fire chief subsequently reported fire and smoke from one of the aircraft wheels. Upon that information the commander decided to go ahead with the evacuation. The CAD annotated: "This decision of evacuation was considered reasonable." The CAD praised the crew: "The crew, as a whole, had demonstrated good crew resource management throughout the flight." The CAD was not satisfied with the performance of Hong Kong ATC stating: "At 0532 hrs, CPA780 called “MAYDAY” and advised HK Approach of the dual engine stall situation. Under the circumstance where a twin-engine aircraft encountered dual engine stall, ATC would, according to standing instructions, upgrade the emergency category to a Full Emergency. However, on this occasion ATC did not upgrade the emergency category. The investigation tried to establish why a “MAYDAY” call associated with a dual engine stall situation had not triggered ATC upgrading the Local Standby to a Full Emergency." and further down commented: "Nevertheless, given the limited time of 11 minutes available from the moment CPA780 declared “MAYDAY” to the time it landed at the airport, there is no evidence suggesting a different emergency category declared by ATC during the accident would have any bearing on the emergency resources attending to CPA780 and the subsequent emergency evacuation." The CAD analysed with respect to the contaminated fuel, that after finding of SAP spheres in the fuel further checks at the fuel metering unit, variable stator vanes control unit and main metering valve found stiction of SAP spheres in the fuel metering unit and variable stator vanes control unit and accumulation of SAP spheres at the main metering valves of both fuel metering units that seized both valves. The CAD analyzed that during the uplift of 24,400kg of fuel the fuelling hose vibrated a number of times, which was abnormal. SAP spheres were found in the filters, hose and dispensers of the fuelling vehicle used to uplift the fuel to the aircraft. The CAD commented: "It was apparent that the contaminated fuel had been supplied to the aircraft." The CAD analyzed that with Surabaya being located close to the seashore it was quite likely that water puddles at the aerodrome contained salt and stated with respect to the ongoing upgrade work on the aerodrome's fuel distribution system: "When there was shortfall in adherence to the tie-in procedures, such salt water could have entered the main distribution pipe of the fuel hydrant circuit." The CAD continued that theoretic considerations verified by a practical test had indicated the possibility that salt water in the fuel could compromise the fuel monitoring system permitting the uplift of fuel despite the presence of contamination: "When the SAP was fully activated with the salt water left inside the fuel hydrant system, the performance of filter monitors was compromised and could not completely shut down the flow. This allowed continuous refuelling through the filter monitors. With such degraded performance of the filter monitors, fuel contamination was not detected by the dispenser operator unless the fuel flow was so restricted that warrant a filter change." 13 immediate safety actions were taken by Surabaya Airport, DGAC Indonesia, CAD and Cathay Pacific, the investigation released four more safety recommendations, two to the airport authority of Surabaya with respect to fuel distribution system and two to ICAO to introduce monitoring of fuel quality, fuel uplift procedures and personnel training at aerodromes as well as the introduction of devices which would stop the uplift of fuel "when the differential pressure across the equipment filtration system is outside the equipment designed value or range."​

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By Simon Hradecky, created Sunday, Nov 1st 2020 17:55Z, last updated Sunday, Nov 1st 2020 17:58Z

In October 2020 the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) released their Safety Information Bulletin SIB 2018-10R1 addressing the events on board of B-HLL of April 2010 as well as at least 7 other similiar events known since 2010. The EASA argues: There have been several events of engine power fluctuations or other occurrences as described in the reference publications that were caused by deposits of Super Absorbent Polymers (SAP) in the aircraft/engine fuel system. These problems are assumed to be caused by a migration of SAP out of filtration devices (filter monitors) that are used in the fuel supply chain to the aircraft. Aircraft and engine type certificate holders consider the presence of SAP in fuel to be a potential flight safety issue and cannot endorse a level of SAP that is acceptable in fuel. The aim of this SIB is to enhance awareness of aircraft and aerodrome operators of the risks associated with SAP in jet fuel, to inform about on-going industry actions on the matter and to provide recommendations for the purpose of mitigating the associated risks. At this time EASA does not regard the issue a safety issue, that would warrant an airworthiness directive or similiar measures. EASA bases the Safety Information Bulletin on findings by the Joint Investigation Group (JIG) about fuel filter monitors of Dec 11th 2017, the findings by IATA's special interest group, a FAA Safety Information Bulletin of Oct 9th 2020 as well as further JIG findings up to Oct 9th 2020.

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By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Jan 20th 2011 17:39Z, last updated Thursday, Jan 20th 2011 17:39Z

Hongkong's Civil Aviation Department (CAD) said in their third preliminary report that the spheres found seizing both engines' variable stator vane controllers were identified to mainly consist of sodium polyacrylate "consistent with the super absorbent polymer (SAP) material used in the filter monitors on a fuelling dispenser". These spheres were present in the hose end strainer of Surabaya's fuel dispenser JUA06 used for refueling B-HLL before the accident flight. The investigation is still working to determine how those spheres were created and how they entered the aircraft. Following the extension work it was noted that between April 10th and April 15th four fuel dispensers had unscheduled fuel filter monitor replacements due to high differential pressure readings of the monitor vessel, which is indicative of a filter monitor clogging. Further tests have been conducted on Surabaya's airport fuel supply system. A fuel sample taking from the supply for stands 5 to 10 showed sodium chloride and water in the sample, the source of the contamination could not be determined however. Another Airbus A330-300 registration B-HLM performing flight CX-780 departing Surabaya on April 12th 2010 had been refueled by dispenser JUA06. During the flight the crew experienced engine #1 (Trent 700, outer left) parameter fluctuations however without associated ECAM messages. The #1 FMU (fuel metering unit) was replaced following the flight. In the light of the accident flight the following day the FMU of B-HLM was also examined and showed contamination with spheres consistent with those found on the accident aircraft. Those spheres were also found in the low pressure fuel filter of the #1 engine of B-HLM. One of the fuel dispensers at Surabaya, monitoring and pressure differential (Photo: CAD):

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By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Aug 11th 2010 10:16Z, last updated Wednesday, Sep 4th 2013 15:59Z

In a new preliminary report Hong Kong's Civil Aviation Department (CAD) said, that the engine fuel components, relevant fuel samples and monitor filters in the vessel of the dispenser refueling the aircraft in Surabaya were collected and sent to the UK for analysis. Flight data and cockpit voice recorders were read out. An examination of the engine fuel components showed, that the main metering valves (MMV) of the fuel metering units (FMU) were seized, the left at a position consistent with the 70% N1 of the left hand engine, the right hand at a position consistent with the 17% N1 achieved by the right hand engine. The right hand engine's variable stator vane controller (VSVC) was also found seized. Fine spherical particles (spheres) were found in the FMU, VSVC and variable stator vane actuator (VSVA) of both engines. No fault has been observed to any component other than those associated with the contamination by spheres. The spheres could not be generated from within the airframe or engine systems under normal operating conditions and environment. The fuel samples also showed contaminations with such spheres. The monitor fuel filters from the dispenser also showed traces of such spheres, spheres were also found in fuel samples taken downstream of the monitor filters. The spheres appeared similiar to those found on the aircraft. The exact nature of the spheres is still under investigation. The flight data recorders and quick access recorders as well as aircraft monitoring system showed no abnormal commands sent from the electronic engine control or autothrust system. The abnormal engine condition therefore is believed to be the result of the contamination with spheres leading to the seizure of the MMVs. The aircraft had loaded 24400 kg of fuel from Surabaya's hydrant refuelling at stand 8, which was part of a circuit refuelling stands 1 to 10. Prior to the event there had been extensive work on that circuit as part of the Surabaya Airport extension project. The refueling circuit was isolated for the investigation. Inspection of the refuelling circuit revealed, that some of the re-commissioning procedures were not in line with guidelines and practises commonly used in the aviation industry. The re-commissioning had not been completed when B-HLL and other aircraft were already being refueled from that circuit. On Aug 16th Indonesia's NTSC contested the findings of the CAD stating, that those statements only represent the Hong Kong side of things. Many Indonesian Aircraft have been refuelled from that circuit and have not suffered any problems. A new investigation is to be carried out by the NTSC to verify the quality of the fuel supplied at the Surabaya Airport.

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By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, May 6th 2010 11:20Z, last updated Thursday, May 6th 2010 11:20Z

Hong Kong's Civil Aviation Department (CAD) have released their preliminary report saying, that the airplane had no observations in the maintenance logs regarding fuel system and engines prior to the accident flight. The airplane took at at 198700 kg takeoff weight, thereof 33400 kg of fuel. During the climb the crew noticed an EPR fluctuation of the right hand engine, the left engine also showed fluctuations however within a narrower range. After levelling off at FL390 the crew received an ECAM message "ENG 2 CTL SYS FAULT", the according checklists were executed and the crew contacted their maintenance department. As all parameters of the engines were normal except the slight EPR fluctuations, it was decided to continue the flight. 100 minutes later the "ENG 2 CTL SYS FAULT" message reappeared, all parameters still remained normal, crew consulted maintenance again and it was decided to carry on. During the descent towards Hong Kong while descending through FL230 the crew received two ECAM messages: "ENG 1 CTL SYS FAULT" and "ENG 2 STALL" within a short period of time. The flight crew advanced the number 1 lever to the max continuous thrust position and pulled the number 2 lever to idle. The crew requested a priority landing and track shortening, air traffic control facilitated the request and sent the airport's emergency services on stand by. 11 minutes later while descending through 8000 feet the crew received an "ENG 1 STALL" ECAM message and declared emergency and actioned the according checklists. The captain attempted to move both thrust levers, during these movements the engine #1 increased thrust to 74% N1 while engine #2 remained at 17% N1 (below idle). The captain flew a visual approach for runway 07L, with both thrust levers at idle the left hand engine #1 showed an N1 of 74% and the right hand engine 17% N1. The left hand engine reduced to 70% N1 during touch down. The airplane touched down at 230 KIAS at a landing weight of 173600 kg, during touch down the left hand engine's underside of the cowling briefly touched the runway. Spoilers deployed automatically, the left hand reverser was deployed, the captain applied maximum manual braking. When the airplane stopped the left hand engine was still running at 76-79% N1. Both engines were shut down, 5 main gear tyres deflated. Emergency services reported smoke and fire from the main gear prompting the crew to initiate an emergency evacuation via the slides, while emergency services sprayed the main gear to battle the fire and cool the brakes down. The CAD does not expect the investigation to conclude in less than a year.

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By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Apr 13th 2010 11:00Z, last updated Saturday, Apr 24th 2010 13:26Z

B-HLL being evacuated (Photo: AP) ​ A Cathay Pacific Airbus A330-300, registration B-HLL performing flight CX-780 from Surabaya (Indonesia) to Hong Kong (China) with 309 passengers and 13 crew, was on approach to Hong Kong, when the crew reported a left hand engine (Trent 772) failure and declared emergency. During roll out on the northern runway 07L brakes overheated resulting in a small fire and 6 main gear tyres deflating. The occupants of the airplane evacuated after standstill. 7 people received injuries in the evacuation. The airline reported, that 5 people were taken to a hospital. The runway was closed for about 2.5 hours. Hong Kong's Civil Aviation Authority said, that one engine had been shut down countering rumours in Hong Kong, that the airplane may have lost both engines on short final. Cathay Pacific reported on Apr 13th, that the airplane touched down on one engine (in response to media reports in Hong Kong, that the second engine had failed on short final 10 minutes after the first was shut down). In an updated press release on Apr 14th Cathay Pacific said, that the left hand engine was delivering 70% N1 stuck at that level, while the right hand engine was delivering idle thrust throughout the approach. The excess thrust delivered by the left hand engine forced a higher than normal approach speed without the usual flap settings. The airplane touched down at 230 KIAS (usual approach speed 135 KIAS), the high speed overheating the brakes and leading to the deflated tyres (all 4 on the left, 2 on the right hand main gear). After landing the crew was informed about smoke and flames at the undercarriage and initiated the evacuation as a reaction to that information. Aviation sources in Hong Kong said on Apr 13th, that both engines got stuck at a setting of about 70% N1 delivering high power. The crew shut the left hand engine down to reduce excess thrust and performed an emergency landing with the other engine still operating at 70% N1. Touch down speed is reported at around 200 KIAS causing the brakes to overheat. Airbus reported later, that both engines were stalled and thrust control was lost for both engines. The right hand engine was delivering thrust below flight idle, the left hand engine thrust above flight idle. The crew received ECAM stall messages for both engines, those messages being usually associated with engine compressor surges. During landing the engine #1 (left hand) cowling scraped the runway. Cathay detailed further, that the aircraft experienced minor EPR oscillations shortly before reaching Top of Climb on departure out of Surabaya. These oscillation had an according indication of fuel flow, an ECAM message was produced for engine #2 (right hand). The crew consulted Cathay's dispatch and it was decided that the EPR oscillations did not warrant a diversion. On initial descent, when the airplane was descending through FL310, the right hand engine experienced a surge and stalled, the engine remained below flight idle for the remainder of the flight. When the airplane levelled off at an intermediate altitude in the latter part of the approach, thrust control over the left hand engine was gradually lost resulting in an uncontrolled thrust increase to 70% N1. The airplane was able to maintain speed and altitude. The crew conducted an ILS approach with flaps reaching stage 1 (selected were flaps 2) and an approach speed of 230 KIAS, the airspeed reduced to 220 KIAS during flare and touch down. Reverse thrust was successfully selected, the crew managed to stop the airplane about 1000 feet before the end of runway 07L (before the threshold runway 25R). Both engines were shut down after the airplane came to a stop, rescue services advised of tyre deflation and presence of smoke and fire around the wheels. An investigation has been initiated that also includes fuel system fault and fuel contamination. Metars: VHHH 130800Z 17014KT 9999 FEW008 SCT018 28/24 Q1012 BECMG 09015KT VHHH 130730Z 16018KT 9999 FEW008 SCT018 29/24 Q1012 NOSIG VHHH 130700Z 16017KT 9999 FEW008 SCT018 29/24 Q1012 NOSIG VHHH 130630Z 16018KT 9999 FEW008 SCT020 29/24 Q1012 WS R07R NOSIG VHHH 130600Z 14017KT 110V170 9999 FEW008 SCT020 29/24 Q1012 NOSIG VHHH 130530Z 15019KT 120V190 9999 FEW008 SCT020 29/24 Q1012 NOSIG VHHH 130500Z 15017KT 9999 FEW008 SCT020 29/24 Q1013 NOSIG VHHH 130430Z 15015KT 9999 FEW006 SCT018 29/24 Q1013 NOSIG VHHH 130400Z 15015KT 130V190 9999 FEW005 SCT018 29/24 Q1014 NOSIG VHHH 130330Z 16015KT 130V210 9999 FEW005 SCT018 29/24 Q1014 WS R07L NOSIG VHHH 130300Z 16014KT 140V210 9999 FEW005 SCT018 29/24 Q1014 WS R07L NOSIG VHHH 130230Z 16014KT 9999 FEW005 SCT018 29/24 Q1014 NOSIG

 

[thunder]

Muy buen documento! Pregunta. Un avión con todo el stress que sufrió este y con semejante aterrizaje, se vuelve a volar ? Es reparable a costo razonable. Habrá mucho daño estructural oculto?.
Saludos !

 

[cosmiccomet74]

Muy buen documento! Pregunta. Un avión con todo el stress que sufrió este y con semejante aterrizaje, se vuelve a volar ? Es reparable a costo razonable. Habrá mucho daño estructural oculto?.
Saludos !

Habria que buscar el s/n del avión en cuestion para saber. Pero todo es reparable siempre que haya dinero.

En el 2006 se nos fue un MD DC10-30ERF de pista en Barranquilla. El avión entro en aquaplaning no freno y se fueron de pista unos 100 metros en el barro. El tren de nariz colapso y se retrajo hacia atras rompiendo el fuselaje.

Ese avión era el más nuevo de la flota, habia sido fabricado en 1983 como avión de pasajeros y el cliente no lo recibio por quiebra. Asi que lo tomo FedeX y lo convirtio a carguero.
El avión tenia el mayor peso de despegue y aterrizaje de la flota, MTOW 580.000 lbs y aterrizaje 435.000 lbs.
Asi que se consiguio el permiso para repararlo para un ferry flight, se lo llevo al aeropuerto de Manta en Ecuador donde habia un taller de mantenimiento autorizado de Boeing para hacerle la reparación.
Se "corto" la parte inferior de la proa de un DC10 de pasajeros y se la transplanto al N305FE.

Quedo muy bien el avión y volo hasta el cierre de la empresa en el 2011.

El PETET IV, un avionazo.

 

[thunder]

Habria que buscar el s/n del avión en cuestion para saber. Pero todo es reparable siempre que haya dinero.

En el 2006 se nos fue un MD DC10-30ERF de pista en Barranquilla. El avión entro en aquaplaning no freno y se fueron de pista unos 100 metros en el barro. El tren de nariz colapso y se retrajo hacia atras rompiendo el fuselaje.

Ese avión era el más nuevo de la flota, habia sido fabricado en 1983 como avión de pasajeros y el cliente no lo recibio por quiebra. Asi que lo tomo FedeX y lo convirtio a carguero.
El avión tenia el mayor peso de despegue y aterrizaje de la flota, MTOW 580.000 lbs y aterrizaje 435.000 lbs.
Asi que se consiguio el permiso para repararlo para un ferry flight, se lo llevo al aeropuerto de Manta en Ecuador donde habia un taller de mantenimiento autorizado de Boeing para hacerle la reparación.
Se "corto" la parte inferior de la proa de un DC10 de pasajeros y se la transplanto al N305FE.

Quedo muy bien el avión y volo hasta el cierre de la empresa en el 2011.

El PETET IV, un avionazo.

Muy buena información ! Gracias!

 

[spirit666]

Han transcurrido 12 días desde el accidente de India y la AAIB hindú aún no emitió ningún informe preliminar. Ansiedad mata objetividad pero estimo que varios puntos ya deben estar clarificados.

La semiala izquierda quedó bastante intacta. Se ven los flaps desplegados lo cual ya elimina una de las primeras hipótesis. Seguramente en dicha semiala quedó combustible para ser analizado con lo cual se podía avanzar en el tema de la contaminación o no del mismo.

En cuanto a los motores, un simple informe visual de las aspas de los rotores permiten determinar inicialmente si ambos estaban o no en funcionamiento al momento del impacto. Los restos de la ya famosa RAT deben haber sido identificados. Estaba o no desplegada ?

La APU junto con el cono de cola prácticamente quedó intacto. Al igual que los motores un simple exámen visual permite establecer si la misma estaba la APU funcionando o no.

Reitero ansiedad mata objetividad pero hay 1300 B-787 volando por todo el mundo. Boeing como la NTSB o el fabricante de los motores no pueden emitir ningún informe preliminar antes que lo haga la AAIB en cuya página aún no hay nada sobre el AI 171. Además de todo lo mencionado recién hoy se dieron cuenta que difícilmente puedan recuperar información de las cajas negras por el daño que presentan (una de ellas se recuperó el mismo día del accidente).

Burocracia hindú, incompetencia o encubrimiento...?

 

[Diego75]

La ultima foto no la habia visto, literalmente se incrusto en la losa del edificio, si la cola quedo "clavada" en ese punto, me imagino el fuselaje

 

[Bf 109]

Muy buen documento! Pregunta. Un avión con todo el stress que sufrió este y con semejante aterrizaje, se vuelve a volar ? Es reparable a costo razonable. Habrá mucho daño estructural oculto?.
Saludos !

Fue almacenado en oct/20 y cortado en jun/21 según airfleets

 

[spirit666]

El Martes pasado sugerí -solo eso- que algo olía mal con la investigación de la caída del 787 de Air India.

Voy con un resúmen que es para analizar

-13 de Junio se recupera una de las cajas negras
-14 de junio se recupera la otra caja negra
-Por 8 días las mismas son "preservadas" en Ahmebaddad (el lugar del accidente)
-El 24 de Junio a las 14:00 hs llega a Nueva Delhi una de las cajas
-El mismo día pero a las 17:15 hs llega la otra a la AAIB de India en Nueva Delhi
-Una de ellas ese mismo día fue a EEUU donde fue leía por la NTSC y regresada de modo urgente a India
-Al día de hoy (28/6) se desconoce el contenido de ambas cajas negras

Cuando los investigadores de la NTSB, Boeing, General Electric y AAIB Reino Unido llegan a India, la zona del accidente ya había sido limpiada en clara contravención a el Anexo XIII de la OACI. En menos de 36 horas todos los restos del 787 fueron removidos del lugar del accidente, interviniendo 5 excavadoras, 15 camiones con palas, 25 camiones de carga y otros 110 vehículos. Nunca se preservó la zona y personal civil como policial de distintas jurisdicciones ingresaron al lugar.

El 16 de Junio -dos días después del accidente- la FAA norteamericana emitió una directiva para los Boeing 787, que recordaba otra directiva de Diciembre de 2024 la cual a su vez "recordaba" otra directiva y recomendación de Enero de 2024 y de Abril de 2023 que hacía referencia a la AD 2016-14-04 del año 2016.

El motivo..? Fuga de líquidos provenientes del baño delantero que se filtraban en la bodega electrónica (donde está el "cerebro" del avión). Una O-ring (arandela de goma) de 5 dólares que las aerolíneas debían reemplazar.

Por lo pronto reina el silencio y se afirma que algún informe preliminar aparecería a fines de Julio. EL gobierno hindú -en contra de lo establecido por la OACI- está interviniendo de modo directo en la investigación, lo cual le quita credibilidad a cualquier informe. Pero ya pasó con Indonesia (737 Silkair) o Egyptarir (767 New Yor y A320 en Mediterráneo) donde se negaron las verdaderas causas de los accidentes.

En tanto hay 1300 B-787 volando en estos momentos.

Esta vez, algo mal huele en India (no Dinamarca).

 

[spirit666]

Comunicado oficial de hoy 29/06/2025:

El Ministro de Aviación Civil de la India declaró: «Nunca ha ocurrido que ambos motores se apagaran a la vez». Los investigadores están analizando las cajas negras desde todos los ángulos, incluyendo problemas con el motor, el suministro de combustible o cualquier otra causa, como un sabotaje (??)Se espera un informe preliminar en tres meses. India aceptó la propuesta de la OACI de contar con un observador de la OACI en la investigación del accidente. El observador no tendrá autoridad para investigar, pero aportará información técnica y garantizará el cumplimiento de las mejores prácticas globales. Esto aumenta la transparencia y refuerza el cumplimiento de la India con las normas internacionales.

Upss.. no aclaren que oscurece..!!

No quiero caer en teorías conspirativas ni nada de eso pero...ahora hablan de 3 meses para un informe preliminar. El 25 de Junio la NTSB en Washington dispuso del módulo de memoria y la extracción de datos fue considerada como positiva. Hablamos de un vuelo que duró no más de 30/40 segundos, mucha data no hay para analizar y todo indica que algo se oculta o se quiere enmascarar o simplemente ganar tiempo.

Como diría un "eximio" forista de ZM, todo muy turbiooo...

 

[Usuario123456]

Comunicado oficial de hoy 29/06/2025:

El Ministro de Aviación Civil de la India declaró: «Nunca ha ocurrido que ambos motores se apagaran a la vez». Los investigadores están analizando las cajas negras desde todos los ángulos, incluyendo problemas con el motor, el suministro de combustible o cualquier otra causa, como un sabotaje (??)Se espera un informe preliminar en tres meses. India aceptó la propuesta de la OACI de contar con un observador de la OACI en la investigación del accidente. El observador no tendrá autoridad para investigar, pero aportará información técnica y garantizará el cumplimiento de las mejores prácticas globales. Esto aumenta la transparencia y refuerza el cumplimiento de la India con las normas internacionales.

Upss.. no aclaren que oscurece..!!

No quiero caer en teorías conspirativas ni nada de eso pero...ahora hablan de 3 meses para un informe preliminar. El 25 de Junio la NTSB en Washington dispuso del módulo de memoria y la extracción de datos fue considerada como positiva. Hablamos de un vuelo que duró no más de 30/40 segundos, mucha data no hay para analizar y todo indica que algo se oculta o se quiere enmascarar o simplemente ganar tiempo.

Como diría un "eximio" forista de ZM, todo muy turbiooo...

no me parece teñir la investigacion con conspiranoia solo porque van a tardar 3 meses. de hecho incluso aceptaron un investigador internacional. dicho en la misma nota que subiste..

hay muchisima informacion para dar, pero para dar una respuesta que afecta tanto a la aviacion tienen que hacer las cosas bien. en una epoca donde la gente sale a afirmar algo, y despues dice que no recordaba haberlo dicho, esta es la diferencia con autos, barcos, etc..

primero se constata que no hay riesgo inminente para la flota mundial ni la operatoria de air india.
y despues se hace el informe. todo a su tiempo

 

[spirit666]

no me parece teñir la investigacion con conspiranoia solo porque van a tardar 3 meses. de hecho incluso aceptaron un investigador internacional. dicho en la misma nota que subiste..

hay muchisima informacion para dar, pero para dar una respuesta que afecta tanto a la aviacion tienen que hacer las cosas bien. en una epoca donde la gente sale a afirmar algo, y despues dice que no recordaba haberlo dicho, esta es la diferencia con autos, barcos, etc..

primero se constata que no hay riesgo inminente para la flota mundial ni la operatoria de air india.
y despues se hace el informe. todo a su tiempo

Totalmente cierto, este es un accidente muy particular porque son muchos los elementos a evaluar y analizar pero también es cierto que no hay ningún registro de otro hecho donde las cajas negras haya permanecido por 8 días sin que su contenido haya sido extraído contando con los medios para ello, tampoco su traslado a Nueva Delhi por separado en sendos vuelos con una diferencia de 3 horas o la increíble rapidez en que todos los restos del avión fueron retirados del sitio del accidente. Al menos son tres las contravenciones a los protocolos de la OACI y eso es muy llamativo.

Por lo pronto en el Reino Unido, luego de analizar prestaciones del 787, longitud de pista, altitud alcanzada y punto de impacto indican que un motor habría fallado al momento de la rotación y que el otro fue reducido a un mínimo de potencia, sólo eso explicaría donde cayó la aeronave ya que de fallar ambos motores de modo simultáneo se habría estrellado a no más de 600 metros de la pista y no a 1,5 km donde lo hizo.

O sea con esta hipótesis, el accidente del Air India se vuelve cada vez más intrigante y complejo.

 

[Pedro Chamarelli]

¡Derribado!

El testimonio del oficial militar responsable de la defensa aérea rusa en Grozni confirma que, aunque no fue posible identificar visualmente el punto que aparecía en el radar, la orden del gobierno ruso fue clara: "Derribado". Se lanzaron dos misiles, uno de los cuales detonó cerca del Embraer E190 de Azerbaiyán Airlines, que se preparaba para aterrizar en Grozni.

Gracias a la combinación de la pericia de la tripulación y la robustez del avión brasileño, la aeronave logró sobrevolar casi 400 km el mar Caspio, estrellándose en el aeropuerto de Aktau, en Kazajistán. De los 67 ocupantes, 29 sobrevivieron.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1940520553036812779

 

[spirit666]

Algunas novedades del accidente del Air India AI-17

* El 20 de Junio -8 días después del accidente- la Dirección General de Aviación Civil de India le solicitó a la aerolínea Air India el despido de la cúpula del sector de planificación y programación de vuelos. Fueron despedidos el vicepresidente, el director general y un ejecutivo de planificación. Se desconoce los motivos pero se habla de exceso en tiempos de servicios y de no haber cumplido los pilotos con la asistencia a los simuladores en tiempo y forma.

* Ese mismo día tres pilotos recrearon en un simulador de B-787 las mismas condiciones del vuelo accidentado, simulando la falla de ambos motores al momento del despegue y luego de un solo motor con repliegue de flaps y dejando el tren de aterrizaje abajo. En el primer caso la aeronave se estrelló y en el segundo caso el avión pudo elevarse hasta 1000 pies.

* Se sospecha que Air India cuenta con información más detallada del accidente mediante el sistema de mensajes automáticos ACARS, donde la aeronave transmite a tierra un mensaje sobre cualquier tipo de fallo.

A seguir esperando noticias...

 

[patricio hernan]

https://www.infobae.com/america/mun...r-de-un-avion-que-se-preparaba-para-despegar/

 

[spirit666]

Actualizando sobre el Air India 171

* Teóricamente mañana Viernes 11, se publica el informe preliminar del accidente que fue presentado el pasado Martes pero que el gobierno hindú decidió mantener en reserva supuestamente hasta mañana que se cumplen los 30 días que exige OACI.

* No hay al respecto muchas expectativas sobre dicho informe. Se estima los formalismos de siempre: datos de la aeronave, pilotos, pasajeros, victimas, meteorología, aeropuerto, etc. sin que se devele la causa -al menos hipotética- del accidente (ojalá que no sea así).

Por lo pronto hay un dato para nada menor. Ni Boeing, ni General Electric ni la FAA norteamericana han emitido un boletín de servicio, notificación o aviso urgente sobre el 787 o sus motores además de confirmarse que el combustible no estaba contaminado.

Mi conlusión es pura especulación, pero si saco de la escena al avión, los motores y el combustible no quedan muchos protagonistas más que los pilotos. Veremos que pasa mañana.