The U.S. military operation in Venezuela, which neutralized air bases, military barracks, and strategic nodes across the country—and ultimately achieved its objective of removing Nicolás Maduro from power—laid bare one of the main structural weaknesses of the Venezuelan Armed Forces: the fragility of its Chinese-origin air defense system when confronted by an adversary with supremacy in electronic warfare, intelligence, and precision strike capabilities. During the short duration of the operation, U.S. assets succeeded in degrading and blinding key sensors within the defensive network, paving the way for the employment of expeditionary air-mobile capabilities from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, known as the Night Stalkers, and the Special Forces Operational Detachment–Delta (1st SFOD-D).
At the core of Venezuela’s defensive architecture was a network of radars supplied by the China Electronics Technology Group, including JYL-1 three-dimensional surveillance systems and the JY-27 metric-wave radar, which for years had been promoted as a supposed “stealth aircraft hunter“. Based on assessments of the swift and decisive operation, these sensors were disabled during the initial phase through intensive electronic jamming, leaving the integrated air defense system without early-warning capability. This was compounded by a widespread electrical power outage across large areas of Venezuela, aimed at dismantling command-and-control capabilities.
The neutralization of the radar network prevented any effective employment of longer-range air defense systems, including the S-300V and Buk-M2 complexes acquired from Russia to establish a layered defense. In parallel, suppression strikes against several Buk-M2 systems—at least two confirmed—completely nullified their ability to respond. With no functional data links and no control of the airspace, air defense units were disconnected from central command, allowing U.S. forces to achieve total air superiority within minutes.
The loss of air control had an immediate impact on Venezuelan ground forces, particularly those deployed in and around the areas of operation. With the effects of SEAD missions, the neutralization of command-and-control capabilities, and the inability to provide an air defense umbrella over military installations, the deployment of MH-60M Black Hawk and MH-47G Chinook helicopters, as well as MV-22 Osprey tiltrotors, was carried out successfully. According to official U.S. statements following the operation, only one helicopter was hit, yet it was able to return to its point of origin without major issues. It is worth noting that the use of the 9K338 system by personnel of the Venezuelan Armed Forces (FANB) has been visually confirmed, albeit in a limited manner.
A similar situation affected fire-support assets, armored units, and other elements, which appear to have remained largely static in the face of the U.S. military operation. It can be assessed that they lacked target information and effective coordination in an environment saturated by electronic warfare. The inability to integrate sensors, fires, and maneuver in real time left these units without the capacity to exert any meaningful influence in mounting an adequate defensive response.
From a military standpoint, analysts agree that the outcome cannot be explained by the failure of a single system, but rather by the inability of a Chinese-designed command-and-control framework to operate under intense interference and multidomain attacks. The U.S. operation exposed the limitations of these architectures when confronted by forces capable of integrating intelligence, electronic warfare, combat aviation, and special operations within a single operational cycle, confirming that superiority lies not solely in hardware, but in the coherence and resilience of the system as a whole.
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