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Mensaje: <blockquote data-quote="SuperEtendard" data-source="post: 165251" data-attributes="member: 128">PARTE 4II. HIGHLIGHTS AND CONCLUSIONSThe first and most obvious conclusion from this study (see Table 1) is that, in practice, it isvirtually impossible to compare aircraft costs with a meaningful degree of accuracy.Even government auditors, with access to classified data, are unable to agree on actual costs. Forexample, the officially quoted prices for the Eurofighter Typhoon vary by as much as 10% betweenBritain and Germany, while price estimates by the GAO, the Department of Defense and the US AirForce for both the JSF and the F-22 vary by as much as 50%.That being said, comparisons of even estimated costs provide useful information, not only on therelative costs of competing aircraft, but also as the basis for generic conclusions about theeconomics of the industry.Thus, Table 1 points to some interesting conclusions about the economics of combat aircraftproduction, and appears to contradict conventional wisdom as to the benefits of internationalcooperation, long production runs and other truisms:1. Aircraft designed by a single country are not necessarily more expensive than thosedeveloped through international cooperation.Gripen and Rafale were both developed by single countries, but end up costing substantially lessthan Eurofighter, which is produced by a four-nation consortium.2. But single-nation development does not guarantee lower costs, as the three US fightersall cost substantially more than the two European “national” fighters, and are comparable to thoseof Eurofighter, a four-nation cooperative program.Conversely, the projected unit cost of the only (partly) cooperative US aircraft, the Joint StrikeFighter, already exceeds that of Gripen and Rafale and of two other US aircraft, F-18E and F-15E,all of which are single-nation designs.3. Long production runs do not always lead to less expensive aircraft.The F-18E, with a production run of 462 aircraft, costs half as much again as the Rafale, which hasa much smaller production run of 294 aircraft. JSF will cost twice as much as Rafale, despite havinga production run almost ten times as large, and half as much again as the F-18E, whose productionrun is five times smaller. All three are modern, multirole combat aircraft.4. While charges for major program stoppages and restructurings add to program costs, theincrease is not proportional to the length of the hiatus. Both Eurofighter and Rafale programswere halted and restructured, adding eight or ten years to their development cycle, while F-15E, F-18E and Gripen were not, yet this is not demonstrably reflected by the difference in theirrespective cost.5. Continuity in development is the best way to avoid cost overruns. Gripen and F-18E (theF-15E is not significant in this respect) are the only programs to have avoided lengthy “freezes”and large-scale re-designs, and their production costs are notably lower than competitors’.Program unit costs of Rafale, Eurofighter and F-22 exploded after they were “suspended” forseveral years for major re-designs or funding shortfalls.6. Although these aircraft were all developed beginning in the late 1980s, and for broadly similarmissions, there is no common ratio between R&D and acquisition costs. Indeed, there seemsto be no correlation whatsoever between these costs, reflecting each aircraft’s unique R&D itineraryand development history.In other words, development costs are influenced not by so much be an aircraft’s actual capabilitiesas by a “smooth” management and development history.</blockquote>

Verificación: Guerra desarrollada entre Argentina y el Reino Unido en 1982