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<blockquote data-quote="carblue" data-source="post: 359371" data-attributes="member: 179"><p>hola,</p><p>estuve buscando y me parece que no se trata de un juego previo a una supuesta invasión a Irán sino uno que se realizó previo a la invasión a Irak, fíjense las fechas!!!!!!!</p><p></p><p>a modo de reseña: los artículos no suman casi nada a los datos del post que generó la charla, simplemente que fijan temporalmente los hechos en el año 2002, como un ensayo para la invasión a Irak (y al final la flota no se hundió....) y no como actuales para una posible invasión a Irán.</p><p>un gran abrazo, y gracias a Guitro por hacerme notar que correspondía editar el post</p><p></p><p>From The New York Times of August 19, 2002</p><p></p><p>By Thom Shanker</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>WASHINGTON, Aug. 19— American forces recently completed the largest joint war-fighting exercise they have ever held, a three-week, $250 million operation that involved 3,500 military and civilian personnel battling in nine live exercise ranges across the United States and in double that many computer simulations.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>Results from the mock combat, planned for two years, are expected to shape planning against future adversaries.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>As they compiled lessons from the exercise, called Millennium Challenge 2002, officers praised new airborne communications that allowed commanders to stay in touch with farflung fighting forces as never before, even while in transcontinental flight to the battlefield. They also emphasized the importance of combining their destructive power with attacks on computer networks as well as with diplomacy.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>Military officials said the troops were also reminded that a wily foe with little to lose retains the historic advantage of the attacker.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>Gen. William F. Kernan, head of the United States Joint Forces Command that organized and operated the war game, said the exercise showed the importance of a Standing Joint Force Headquarters to coordinate the efforts of all the armed services during wartime.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>The idea, he said, is to avoid “the ad hoc nature” of past wartime command headquarters, thrown together in time of emergency. The standing headquarters would “provide future commanders with a skill set of people with military specialties and a solid appreciation for the complexities of the region,” he said.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>In the simulation of a Persian Gulf conflict with a foe that might have been Iran or Iraq but was called merely Red, American forces — or Blue — suffered unexpected losses from a sneak attack early in the fighting but then emerged victorious.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>In the opening hours of the conflict, the enemy commander was able to deceive American forces by protecting his messages from electronic snooping: he communicated with field officers via motorcycle messengers. </p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>Enemy planes and ships conducted innocent-looking maneuvers for several days in a row, establishing a pattern that did not appear threatening. But the maneuvers left the forces well positioned for a surprise attack, which was initiated using code words during the morning call to prayer from the nation’s minarets. In the computer simulation, an aircraft carrier battle group and ships of a marine Amphibious Ready Group suffered severe damage, according to the enemy chief of state, played by Robert B. Oakley, a former ambassador to Pakistan who also served as the State Department’s counterterrorism director.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>The American forces “sailed into the gulf assuming they could establish superiority, and disrupt the enemy’s command, control and communications with technology,” Mr. Oakley said. “But Red decided to surprise them by going first, and used some time-tested techniques for sending messages in ways that can’t be picked up electronically or jammed. Red sank a lot of the fleet.”</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>All exercises are to a certain extent artificial, unable to reflect the entire spectrum of wartime, from life-and-death stress on a single soldier to the impact of public opinion as battlefield fortunes wax and wane.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>Senior military officers said the value of the exercise was that it required completing a range of missions to test 51 separate military initiatives.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>Because many aspects of the war game remain classified, officers would not detail the extent of simulated damage to the fleet, nor say whether the exercise was restarted after the fleet was theoretically hit. Analysis from the enemy commander, played by Paul Van Riper, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general, will be incorporated into a final report.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>“Both Red and Blue were constrained during the exercise,” said one military officer. “You can’t stop the entire game when one side gets too clever.”</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>In the end, officials said, the joint American forces — Air Force, Army, Marines, Navy and Special Operations — were declared victorious.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>Weapons of mass destruction figured heavily in the exercise, with American forces ordered to attack four sites containing chemical weapons or their delivery systems.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>One technological system tested was a complete headquarters-sized communications system that was loaded onto a C-17 cargo plane. Lt.. Gen. B. B. Bell, commander for all American forces in the exercise, planned and directed missions while aloft. “We could do what we could do in a large headquarters while we were airborne,” General Bell said. ‘I had all the tools I would normally have in a fixed base.”</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>New communications and tracking systems also allowed commanders to integrate attacks by both Army and Marine Corps ground troops, rather than assign them complementary but separate missions.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>“Instead of drawing a line on the map, with the Army on one side and Marines on the other, a commander can now integrate those forces,” said Brig. Gen. James B. Smith, who directed the exercise.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>General Smith said the value of the exercise, like any war game, would only become clear in the months ahead as the exercise was analyzed and its lessons pushed throughout all the armed services.</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p>“The sunset of this event is the sunrise of a process to work the challenges of integrating operations of the armed services,” he said. “If we say this is over, then we’re making a huge mistake.”</p><p></p><p><a href="http://www.badattitudes.com/TimeGame.html" target="_blank">http://www.badattitudes.com/TimeGame.html</a></p><p><a href="http://www.badattitudes.com/ArmyTime.html" target="_blank">http://www.badattitudes.com/ArmyTime.html</a></p><p><a href="http://www.badattitudes.com/WarGames.html" target="_blank">http://www.badattitudes.com/WarGames.html</a></p><p>Pentagon Rigs $250M War Game,</p><p>Evoking Yawns from Major Media</p><p>by</p><p></p><p>Jerome Doolittle</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>Back on August 16 the Army Times ran a long and exceptionally solid story on how the Defense Department’s rigged of a $250 million war game to show how easily our boys could crush an unnamed foe in the Persian Gulf. </p><p></p><p>A quarter billion here, a quarter billion there, and pretty soon you’re talking real money. What’s more, Mr. Bush is desperately seeking an actual war in the Persian Gulf at this very moment, with a named foe in mind. </p><p></p><p>You’d think, then, that the press would have paid major attention. Not Britney Spears or Eminem attention, of course, but maybe at least at Martha Stewart level. </p><p></p><p>You would be wrong. </p><p></p><p>On August 20 a socialist web site, Socialist Worker Online, ran an article based on the Army Times piece. Next day The Virginian-Pilot ran a piece which added a quote or two. It was a hometown story for the Virginian-Pilot, as the games were headquartered in Norfolk. </p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>•</p><p></p><p></p><p>That was it, until the New York Times administered the coup de grace on August 20. This journalistic piece of work ran under the catchy headline, “U.S. Explores a New World of Warfare.” The subhead, too, clamored for attention: “Huge Exercise May Shape Planning.” </p><p></p><p>Readers who waded further into this sludge had to wait till the seventh paragraph before coming across the first hint that something was fishy: “American forces suffered unexpected losses from a sneak attack early in the fighting but then emerged victorious.” </p><p></p><p>In the fourteenth paragraph a mysterious figure made a cameo appearance: “Analysis from the enemy commander, played by Paul Van Riper, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general, will be incorporated into a final report.” The Mystery Marine then disappeared from the narrative, never no more to be seen. </p><p></p><p>To appreciate the significance of this bit of peek-a-boo, I urge you to read Sean D. Naylor’s original story in the Army Times. Now read the full text of Thom Shanker’s New York Times story debunking it. You be the judge. </p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>•</p><p></p><p></p><p>Or you can settle for my too-brief summary of Naylor’s excellent account: </p><p></p><p>General Van Riper quit halfway through the game, disgusted because he wasn’t allowed to win. The general’s version of the costly exercise, called Millennium 02, was fully supported by another participant, former U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley. The ambassador confirmed that Van Riper had sunk most of the American fleet. The general quit when he learned that his orders weren’t being relayed to his troops in the field -- by command of the exercise director. </p><p></p><p>The whole three-week, 13,500-man war game, the general charged, was scripted to validate the Defense Department’s “New World of Warfare.” (This is described as a collection of joint-service, high-tech war fighting concepts.) </p><p></p><p>General Van Riper countered with such low-tech, low-cost concepts as small fishing boats, light aircraft, and a communications network that relied on motorcycle couriers and muezzins calling from the minarets of mosques. </p><p></p><p>Ambassador Oakley told the Army Times that the Joint Forces Command had to halt the exercise and “refloat” the fleet before it could continue. </p><p></p><p>And so on. </p><p></p><p></p><p>•</p><p></p><p></p><p>And so what, really? The behavior of human beings assembled into large groups is well understood. The Defense Department is a large group of humans. When threatened, it can only obey its bureaucratic genes. It closes its eyes, covers its ears, and spits at the enemy. </p><p></p><p>The New York Times comprises a much smaller group, but carries the same bureaucratic genes. Its first institutional reaction to a good story uncovered by some tiny trade publication will not typically be one of admiration and large-hearted generosity. Nor would the Times be in any big hurry to offer its readers this new and instructive information, nor to hire the journalist who beat out its own Washington bureau. </p><p></p><p>Instead the first reaction of the reporter who missed the story and the editors who hired him will be to bury this little upstart’s story, preferably in public. Mr. Shanker’s article is an excellent example of how the big boys handle such matters. </p><p></p><p>Once the Times’s man had helped the Pentagon trash the original Army Times story, further eruptions of it elsewhere could be shrugged off easily. We here at the real Times had one of our top men look into that, actually, and unfortunately this Van Riper fellow turned out to be something of a nut job. </p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>•</p><p></p><p></p><p>And thus the story died, was buried -- and then, astonishingly, was resurrected in the New York Times itself. Columnist Nicholas D. Kristof ran an op-ed piece about the rigged war games on September 6 quoting General Van Riper and Ambassador Oakley and coming to this conclusion: </p><p></p><p>“I’d feel reassured if the decision to invade (Iraq) was being made honestly, after a rigorous weighing of all the risks. Instead I detect a cheery Vietnam-style faith that obstacles can be assumed away. That only works in war games.” </p><p></p><p>Unfortunately Mr. Kristof’s column didn’t motivate his editors to call in the old Whitewater team and see what it could do if assigned to a story of actual significance. But Mr. Kristof’s point remains. </p><p></p><p>This isn’t the first rigged war game in Pentagon history, after all. There was a precedent back in 1962, called Omega. This little-known and long-forgotten exercise ended with Ho Chi Minh controlling most of Indochina, in spite of 500,000 American troops on the ground. Since such a result was obvious nonsense, the strategic planners went back to the drawing board. But the second dress rehearsal, Omega II, ended the same way. </p><p></p><p>And so did the play itself, after a bloody run of thirteen years. </p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>•</p><p></p><p></p><p>(The story of Omega I and II is to be found in Shooting at the Moon, Roger Warner’s excellent history of the secret war in Laos. I’ve posted these pages of his book , and hope you’ll take a look. Afterwards you can write a letter to your congressman or to George W. Bush himself, for all the good it’ll do you.) </p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>•</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>September, 2002</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="carblue, post: 359371, member: 179"] hola, estuve buscando y me parece que no se trata de un juego previo a una supuesta invasión a Irán sino uno que se realizó previo a la invasión a Irak, fíjense las fechas!!!!!!! a modo de reseña: los artículos no suman casi nada a los datos del post que generó la charla, simplemente que fijan temporalmente los hechos en el año 2002, como un ensayo para la invasión a Irak (y al final la flota no se hundió....) y no como actuales para una posible invasión a Irán. un gran abrazo, y gracias a Guitro por hacerme notar que correspondía editar el post From The New York Times of August 19, 2002 By Thom Shanker WASHINGTON, Aug. 19— American forces recently completed the largest joint war-fighting exercise they have ever held, a three-week, $250 million operation that involved 3,500 military and civilian personnel battling in nine live exercise ranges across the United States and in double that many computer simulations. Results from the mock combat, planned for two years, are expected to shape planning against future adversaries. As they compiled lessons from the exercise, called Millennium Challenge 2002, officers praised new airborne communications that allowed commanders to stay in touch with farflung fighting forces as never before, even while in transcontinental flight to the battlefield. They also emphasized the importance of combining their destructive power with attacks on computer networks as well as with diplomacy. Military officials said the troops were also reminded that a wily foe with little to lose retains the historic advantage of the attacker. Gen. William F. Kernan, head of the United States Joint Forces Command that organized and operated the war game, said the exercise showed the importance of a Standing Joint Force Headquarters to coordinate the efforts of all the armed services during wartime. The idea, he said, is to avoid “the ad hoc nature” of past wartime command headquarters, thrown together in time of emergency. The standing headquarters would “provide future commanders with a skill set of people with military specialties and a solid appreciation for the complexities of the region,” he said. In the simulation of a Persian Gulf conflict with a foe that might have been Iran or Iraq but was called merely Red, American forces — or Blue — suffered unexpected losses from a sneak attack early in the fighting but then emerged victorious. In the opening hours of the conflict, the enemy commander was able to deceive American forces by protecting his messages from electronic snooping: he communicated with field officers via motorcycle messengers. Enemy planes and ships conducted innocent-looking maneuvers for several days in a row, establishing a pattern that did not appear threatening. But the maneuvers left the forces well positioned for a surprise attack, which was initiated using code words during the morning call to prayer from the nation’s minarets. In the computer simulation, an aircraft carrier battle group and ships of a marine Amphibious Ready Group suffered severe damage, according to the enemy chief of state, played by Robert B. Oakley, a former ambassador to Pakistan who also served as the State Department’s counterterrorism director. The American forces “sailed into the gulf assuming they could establish superiority, and disrupt the enemy’s command, control and communications with technology,” Mr. Oakley said. “But Red decided to surprise them by going first, and used some time-tested techniques for sending messages in ways that can’t be picked up electronically or jammed. Red sank a lot of the fleet.” All exercises are to a certain extent artificial, unable to reflect the entire spectrum of wartime, from life-and-death stress on a single soldier to the impact of public opinion as battlefield fortunes wax and wane. Senior military officers said the value of the exercise was that it required completing a range of missions to test 51 separate military initiatives. Because many aspects of the war game remain classified, officers would not detail the extent of simulated damage to the fleet, nor say whether the exercise was restarted after the fleet was theoretically hit. Analysis from the enemy commander, played by Paul Van Riper, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general, will be incorporated into a final report. “Both Red and Blue were constrained during the exercise,” said one military officer. “You can’t stop the entire game when one side gets too clever.” In the end, officials said, the joint American forces — Air Force, Army, Marines, Navy and Special Operations — were declared victorious. Weapons of mass destruction figured heavily in the exercise, with American forces ordered to attack four sites containing chemical weapons or their delivery systems. One technological system tested was a complete headquarters-sized communications system that was loaded onto a C-17 cargo plane. Lt.. Gen. B. B. Bell, commander for all American forces in the exercise, planned and directed missions while aloft. “We could do what we could do in a large headquarters while we were airborne,” General Bell said. ‘I had all the tools I would normally have in a fixed base.” New communications and tracking systems also allowed commanders to integrate attacks by both Army and Marine Corps ground troops, rather than assign them complementary but separate missions. “Instead of drawing a line on the map, with the Army on one side and Marines on the other, a commander can now integrate those forces,” said Brig. Gen. James B. Smith, who directed the exercise. General Smith said the value of the exercise, like any war game, would only become clear in the months ahead as the exercise was analyzed and its lessons pushed throughout all the armed services. “The sunset of this event is the sunrise of a process to work the challenges of integrating operations of the armed services,” he said. “If we say this is over, then we’re making a huge mistake.” [url]http://www.badattitudes.com/TimeGame.html[/url] [url]http://www.badattitudes.com/ArmyTime.html[/url] [url]http://www.badattitudes.com/WarGames.html[/url] Pentagon Rigs $250M War Game, Evoking Yawns from Major Media by Jerome Doolittle Back on August 16 the Army Times ran a long and exceptionally solid story on how the Defense Department’s rigged of a $250 million war game to show how easily our boys could crush an unnamed foe in the Persian Gulf. A quarter billion here, a quarter billion there, and pretty soon you’re talking real money. What’s more, Mr. Bush is desperately seeking an actual war in the Persian Gulf at this very moment, with a named foe in mind. You’d think, then, that the press would have paid major attention. Not Britney Spears or Eminem attention, of course, but maybe at least at Martha Stewart level. You would be wrong. On August 20 a socialist web site, Socialist Worker Online, ran an article based on the Army Times piece. Next day The Virginian-Pilot ran a piece which added a quote or two. It was a hometown story for the Virginian-Pilot, as the games were headquartered in Norfolk. • That was it, until the New York Times administered the coup de grace on August 20. This journalistic piece of work ran under the catchy headline, “U.S. Explores a New World of Warfare.” The subhead, too, clamored for attention: “Huge Exercise May Shape Planning.” Readers who waded further into this sludge had to wait till the seventh paragraph before coming across the first hint that something was fishy: “American forces suffered unexpected losses from a sneak attack early in the fighting but then emerged victorious.” In the fourteenth paragraph a mysterious figure made a cameo appearance: “Analysis from the enemy commander, played by Paul Van Riper, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general, will be incorporated into a final report.” The Mystery Marine then disappeared from the narrative, never no more to be seen. To appreciate the significance of this bit of peek-a-boo, I urge you to read Sean D. Naylor’s original story in the Army Times. Now read the full text of Thom Shanker’s New York Times story debunking it. You be the judge. • Or you can settle for my too-brief summary of Naylor’s excellent account: General Van Riper quit halfway through the game, disgusted because he wasn’t allowed to win. The general’s version of the costly exercise, called Millennium 02, was fully supported by another participant, former U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley. The ambassador confirmed that Van Riper had sunk most of the American fleet. The general quit when he learned that his orders weren’t being relayed to his troops in the field -- by command of the exercise director. The whole three-week, 13,500-man war game, the general charged, was scripted to validate the Defense Department’s “New World of Warfare.” (This is described as a collection of joint-service, high-tech war fighting concepts.) General Van Riper countered with such low-tech, low-cost concepts as small fishing boats, light aircraft, and a communications network that relied on motorcycle couriers and muezzins calling from the minarets of mosques. Ambassador Oakley told the Army Times that the Joint Forces Command had to halt the exercise and “refloat” the fleet before it could continue. And so on. • And so what, really? The behavior of human beings assembled into large groups is well understood. The Defense Department is a large group of humans. When threatened, it can only obey its bureaucratic genes. It closes its eyes, covers its ears, and spits at the enemy. The New York Times comprises a much smaller group, but carries the same bureaucratic genes. Its first institutional reaction to a good story uncovered by some tiny trade publication will not typically be one of admiration and large-hearted generosity. Nor would the Times be in any big hurry to offer its readers this new and instructive information, nor to hire the journalist who beat out its own Washington bureau. Instead the first reaction of the reporter who missed the story and the editors who hired him will be to bury this little upstart’s story, preferably in public. Mr. Shanker’s article is an excellent example of how the big boys handle such matters. Once the Times’s man had helped the Pentagon trash the original Army Times story, further eruptions of it elsewhere could be shrugged off easily. We here at the real Times had one of our top men look into that, actually, and unfortunately this Van Riper fellow turned out to be something of a nut job. • And thus the story died, was buried -- and then, astonishingly, was resurrected in the New York Times itself. Columnist Nicholas D. Kristof ran an op-ed piece about the rigged war games on September 6 quoting General Van Riper and Ambassador Oakley and coming to this conclusion: “I’d feel reassured if the decision to invade (Iraq) was being made honestly, after a rigorous weighing of all the risks. Instead I detect a cheery Vietnam-style faith that obstacles can be assumed away. That only works in war games.” Unfortunately Mr. Kristof’s column didn’t motivate his editors to call in the old Whitewater team and see what it could do if assigned to a story of actual significance. But Mr. Kristof’s point remains. This isn’t the first rigged war game in Pentagon history, after all. There was a precedent back in 1962, called Omega. This little-known and long-forgotten exercise ended with Ho Chi Minh controlling most of Indochina, in spite of 500,000 American troops on the ground. Since such a result was obvious nonsense, the strategic planners went back to the drawing board. But the second dress rehearsal, Omega II, ended the same way. And so did the play itself, after a bloody run of thirteen years. • (The story of Omega I and II is to be found in Shooting at the Moon, Roger Warner’s excellent history of the secret war in Laos. I’ve posted these pages of his book , and hope you’ll take a look. Afterwards you can write a letter to your congressman or to George W. Bush himself, for all the good it’ll do you.) • September, 2002 [/QUOTE]
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