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Mensaje: <blockquote data-quote="BorisD" data-source="post: 1981378" data-attributes="member: 13557">"In addition to land-attack forces, China’s counter-maritime capabilities also constitute a major A2/AD threat to U.S. sea control in the region. Many of the weapons are strikingly modern, and include a variety of anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles (ASBM/ASCM) that can also be launched from the air, land or sea. With an estimated range exceeding 800nm, the new DF-21D ASBM may force aircraft carriers to remain beyond distances suitable for efficient air operations, drastically reducing the effectiveness of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG)."Fatalista. No considera contramedidas de los sistemas estadounidenses ni la supervivencia que presenten las zonas de lanzamiento de esos sistemas.Al respecto, parece que los sistemas sí son capaces -al menos en lo teórico- "As reported in a 2004 Office of Naval Intelligence report, China’s ASBM capability centers on a variant of the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile. The DF-21 is a modified version of one of the new generation of road-mobile, solid-fuel Chinese missiles designed to execute rapid launches, enabling “shoot-and-scoot” operations to enhance the system’s survivability.40 The DF-21 has a nominal combat range exceeding 1,100 nm, and carries maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRVs) equipped with both active and passive radar seekers.41 Although the technical hurdles in developing such a system are significant, some experts believe that the Chinese have already completed operational tests of the DF-21 ASBM. Other reports suggest the Chinese are now developing a special submunition warhead for the missile with clusters of non-explosive flechette penetrators designed to damage a carrier by kinetic impact, and a high-power microwave warhead designed to disable naval radars with electromagnetic pulses. Such warheads would allow the PRC to “mission-kill” a carrier" (Hewson, “Dragon’s Teeth—Chinese Missiles Raise Their Game,” p. 22.).Sigo, de todas formas, desconfiando de su efectividad o de la incapacidad de contrarrestar esto por parte de los elementos navales de la OTAN. Tal vez alguien con conocimientos en este campo pueda aclararlo."The quality and quantity of the Chinese advanced integrated air defense system (IADS) and their modern fighter aircraft present a level of defensive capability not experienced by any military in the history of warfare, including that of the United States"Discrepo. La IADS de Vietnam del Norte era, para la época, de lo más avanzado, y se combinaba con la carencia, por parte de EEUU (USAF/USN), de doctrina SEAD.(Young, Barren SEAD: USAF Defense Suppression Doctrine, 1953-1972)Actualmente, EEUU cuenta con aeronaves especializadas, tácticas desarrolladas y una gran gama de opciones en cuanto a armamento a emplear y plataformas de lanzamiento."Attacks on U.S. cyber and space targets threaten to disrupt or even completely deny multiple enablers of U.S. power projection, including but not limited to satellite communications and Global Positioning System (GPS) based navigation systems"Esto sí es algo a tener en cuenta. Sin embargo, la misma suerte correrían los sistemas chinos."One example of an indirect approach is to attack Chinese merchant shipping and resources transiting the Strait of Malacca. Since 80% of China’s imported oil passes through these waters, the Strait is arguably a potential decisive point for U.S. and Chinese forces in a western Pacific conflict."Interesante"The Threat to Forward Bases Chinese planners believe that if war were to break out with the United States over Taiwan or some other flashpoint in East Asia, the US military would, consistent with past practice, begin operations by conducting an air and missile strike campaign while it begins to build up a powerful regional battle network and associated forces. To defeat US forces, the Chinese military would conduct preemptive attacks (including cyber strikes) on US theater ports and airfields, aircraft carriers and large surface combatants operating in theater, as well as on logistics, transportation, and support forces, and US battle networks. The Chinese might also employ coercive measures designed to convince US allies to deny American forces access to their bases.31 To threaten US access to forward land bases, the PLA has equipped its 2nd Artillery units opposite Taiwan with roughly 1,100 mobile, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), and has been increasing their numbers at the rate of one hundred per year.32 More recent generations boast greater range, enhanced accuracy, and the ability to carry a variety of conventional payloads, including unitary warheads and submunitions.33 China is also increasing its medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) (those with a range of 1,000–3,000 km, or roughly 600–2,000 miles) forces, and improving their guidance systems, with an eye toward holding at risk bases out to the second island chain, where the United States is currently engaged in converting Andersen Air Force base and naval facilities at Guam into a major forward operating base. These missiles are capable of delivering a range of conventional munitions as well as weapons of mass destruction. They may also prove useful in conducting counter-network attacks, for example by using nuclear weapons to generate an electromagnetic pulse. China is also modernizing its long-range aviation forces. The PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF’s) modernized FB-7A fighter-bomber will augment the PLAAF’s F-10 and Su-30MKK multirole strike aircraft. The PLAAF is also upgrading its H-6 bomber fleet to carry a new long-range cruise missile". Del texto "Why AirSea Battle?..."El mismo texto cita menciones del 93 al respecto del riesgo que corren las bases ante ataques preventivos. Esto supone que el agresor es el otro país. Si la cosa se invirtiera, EEUU tendría la misma capacidad de acestar un golpe crítico de entrada para ganar tiempo o asegurar una ventana para ingresar más elementos al teatro de operaciones.</blockquote>

Verificación: Libertador de Argentina