Following the escalation of the war between the United States, Israel, and Iran, the capture of the strategic island of Kharg, together with the role of U.S. military operations and the growing pressure on Iran, has become a central focus of geopolitical analysis in the Middle East. The increase in the U.S. deployment, combined with assessments of a possible ground action, raises questions about Washington’s real objectives and the possible evolution of the conflict in the Persian Gulf. In this context, the presence of expeditionary forces, amphibious ships, and airborne units suggests that the island could be considered a critical point for limited operations, although with deep strategic implications for the region.
The arrival of the amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LHA-7) in the area of responsibility of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), confirmed by Central Command, marks a milestone within the ongoing military reinforcement. The unit, flagship of the Tripoli Amphibious Group and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (31st MEU), operates with around 3,500 sailors and Marines, integrating transport aircraft, fighter jets, and amphibious capabilities that broaden the range of possible missions in the Persian Gulf scenario. The arrival of this group also raises the level of operational readiness to respond to contingencies in an environment of sustained tension.
In mid-March, USS Tripoli was transiting the South China Sea en route to the Middle East, accompanied by USS New Orleans (LPD-18) and USS San Diego (LPD-22), both San Antonio-class ships specialized in amphibious operations. This escort increases the troop deployment capacity, assault equipment, and logistical elements, reinforcing the tactical reach of the 31st MEU. The coordinated transit of these platforms reflects prior planning geared toward scenarios in which mobility and maritime assault capability are essential.
Parallel to these movements, reports emerged mentioning the possibility that the United States may consider deploying a third nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to the Middle East. Speculation centers on USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), which recently completed operational evaluations in the Atlantic. Although there is no official confirmation from the U.S. Department of War, the mere consideration of such a measure indicates that Washington is assessing the expansion of its naval structure in order to sustain the ongoing air campaign and support a possible broader operational scenario.
The importance of the island
Information published by The Times of Israel and circulated by the Telegram channel “Entre Guerras” indicates that the United States is analyzing a limited ground operation aimed at capturing Kharg Island, a key node in Iran’s oil system. According to these sources, the premise would be that Tehran would yield under more intense military pressure, given the low probability that it would accept the alleged unofficial 15-point U.S. plan. The seizure of Kharg, from where nearly 90% of Iranian crude oil is exported, would constitute a direct blow to the economy of the Islamic Republic.
In this context, CNN reported that Iran began reinforcing the island’s defenses in light of the possibility of a U.S. offensive. This move came after Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated that “the country’s enemies are planning to seize an Iranian island,” in clear reference to Kharg. The increase in ground and coastal defenses underscores that Tehran recognizes the strategic vulnerability of the enclave and is anticipating a possible landing attempt.
Officials from countries acting as mediators between Washington and Tehran maintain that, even if the United States were able to capture Kharg, maintaining control over it would require a greater volume of troops and a prolonged commitment. According to these sources, a limited scenario of between four and six weeks would not be enough to guarantee stability on the island, given the likelihood of Iranian reprisals and the need to secure critical maritime routes. The sources add that the Islamic Republic would not accept conditions it had already rejected before the start of hostilities, even under direct military pressure.
The diplomatic situation also shows contradictory signs. While Donald Trump stated that the United States remains in contact with Iran to negotiate an end to the conflict, Tehran denied the existence of any open channel. This divergence comes at a time when the U.S. military presence — including expeditionary and airborne units — continues to expand steadily, indicating a dual strategy that combines coercion with a limited and unclear diplomatic margin.
What units does the United States have to carry out a ground action?
Operation Epic Fury, launched on February 28, reshaped the regional strategic balance and opened the possibility of a limited ground intervention as a complement. Although there are no indications of a large-scale invasion, the combination of maritime, air, and airborne forces points to an operational design centered on specific objectives capable of temporarily altering Iran’s power projection.
In terms of capabilities, the United States maintains two Marine Expeditionary Units as the core of its force posture in the Middle East: the 31st MEU aboard USS Tripoli and the 11th MEU embarked on USS Boxer. Together, they amount to approximately 4,500 personnel capable of conducting amphibious operations, air assault missions, and control of coastal zones without depending on permanent bases. Each MEU integrates a reinforced infantry battalion, an air component with F-35Bs and helicopters, a robust logistical element, and a tactical command adaptable to short-duration missions.
As a complement, the 82nd Airborne Division of the U.S. Army deployed around 2,000 soldiers belonging to its Immediate Response Force. This unit, trained to conduct parachute jumps and seize airfields within hours, operates without heavy armor, which reinforces its role in rapid actions rather than in a prolonged occupation. Its capacity to secure strategic points would make it possible to open entry routes for additional forces in the event of a specific operation on the island.
The “Costs and Benefits” of capturing Kharg Island
The composition of these forces suggests that the main scenarios being contemplated by the Pentagon include securing maritime routes in the Strait of Hormuz, incursions against coastal facilities, and the temporary seizure of objectives such as Kharg. The absence of mechanized divisions and large logistical structures is consistent with planning geared toward tactical and limited actions, rather than an extensive ground campaign inside Iranian territory.
In practice, the capture of Kharg Island would have significant implications for the regional energy balance. It would directly affect Iran’s crude export capacity, exert immediate economic pressure, and alter the dynamics of the global oil market. However, maintaining a prolonged presence would require a sustained effort in the face of possible Iranian attacks from the mainland and from coastal platforms. This operational dilemma constrains the U.S. margin of maneuver and increases the strategic cost of direct intervention.
Finally, the combined analysis of military movements, speculation over new naval deployments, and contradictory signals on the diplomatic front indicates that Washington is keeping several options open. The capture of Kharg appears as a viable objective within a limited operation, but one that would be difficult to sustain over time without a broader escalation. In this scenario, the interaction between military coercion and diplomacy will determine whether the island becomes the next critical point of the conflict or whether the current pressure is simply aimed at altering Iran’s strategic calculus without reaching the point of a landing.
Images for illustrative purposes.
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