Over the course of 2025, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) significantly deepened the reach, frequency, and complexity of its military activities across the Indo-Pacific, consolidating a trend that has been accelerating in previous years. According to a recent report by the CSIS China Power Project, Beijing not only increased the number of exercises and naval deployments, but also steadily expanded the geographic areas in which it operates, with a clear focus on Taiwan, Japan, and the First Island Chain.
One of the central axes of this intensification was the Taiwan Strait and the surrounding waters, where the PLAN combined air and naval patrols, live-fire drills, and joint maritime–air “blockade”” maneuvers. Throughout 2025, multiple episodes were recorded—in different exercises—in which Chinese surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft operated simultaneously in the northern, southern, and eastern sectors of the island, rehearsing isolation and access-control scenarios, in line with China’s doctrine of applying pressure without formally crossing the line separating both sides.
Japanese monitoring and exercises beyond traditional limits
In parallel, Japan remained another of the main theaters for China’s naval activity. In that regard, the report highlights an increase in the transit of Chinese warships through key straits such as Miyako, Tsushima, and Tokara—critical passages for reaching the Western Pacific from the surrounding seas. These operations were regularly accompanied by Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force units, reflecting a surveillance dynamic that has become increasingly routine and that underscores the strategic importance of the First Island Chain as both a geographic and military barrier.
Building on this, the First Island Chain—stretching from Japan to the Philippines via Taiwan—appears in the analysis as a central operational concept for the PLAN in 2025. In this sense, the recorded activities show a deliberate effort to conduct operations beyond that boundary, projecting power into the Western Pacific and testing the PLAN’s ability to operate at greater distances, as seen in cases involving Australia.
Many of these deployments have featured the recurring presence of China’s most modern destroyers—Type 052D and Type 055—alongside modern frigates and logistics support ships, highlighting the shift toward a navy capable of projecting beyond adjacent waters.
Coordination with Russia
Another relevant element mentioned by the report was coordination with other forces, especially Russia—although the analysis notes that these exercises were more limited in scope compared to the focus on Taiwan and Japan. In that context, it states that during 2025 there were joint maneuvers in the Western Pacific and adjacent seas, primarily oriented toward interoperability, anti-submarine warfare, and air defense. As an illustrative example—and considering the broader regional picture—early 2026 drew attention due to the multinational exercise Will for Peace 2026, held in South Africa in mid-January, involving not only Russia and China but also Iran.
Overall, the expansion and intensification of Chinese naval activity during 2025 reflects a strategy of gradual pressure and the normalization of military presence in disputed or sensitive areas. More than isolated actions, it represents a sustained pattern intended to signal to regional actors the PLAN’s growing presence and capabilities, while also testing reaction times, allied coordination mechanisms, and the political limits of deterrence.
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