In a move that could mark a turning point in the relationship between two longtime rivals, the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam have launched joint military exercises in China’s southern Guangxi autonomous region, right on the border between the two nations. Described as a “border cooperation exercise,” the operation includes mountain rescue training, coordinated maneuvers in jungle terrain, and joint logistics drills.
The choice of Guangxi is far from coincidental—it is a historically sensitive area located near the epicenter of past border clashes between the two countries. Holding combined maneuvers in such a location reflects an effort by both Beijing and Hanoi to project an image of stability and strategic understanding amid an increasingly tense regional climate, especially in the South China Sea.
Wartime legacy: memory of armed conflict
Relations between China and Vietnam were tense throughout much of the 20th century. Although both countries shared a communist ideology during the Cold War, the rupture began to become evident after Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 1978, which ended the pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge regime. In retaliation, China invaded northern Vietnam in February 1979 in what it called a “punitive war.” Although Beijing declared victory shortly afterward, the conflict left tens of thousands dead on both sides and deep political scars.
The armed confrontation was not limited to the 1979 war. During the following decade, sporadic clashes occurred along the land border and skirmishes at sea, especially in the Spratly Islands, where in 1988 dozens of Vietnamese sailors were killed in a confrontation with Chinese vessels. It was not until 1991 that both countries formally reestablished diplomatic relations, but the wounds of the conflict have persisted in the collective memory and in the mutual perception of each other as strategic rivals.
Current tensions: maritime disputes and the balance of power
Despite increased bilateral trade and normalized diplomacy, tensions between Vietnam and China have persisted, especially in the South China Sea. China claims virtually the entire sea, delineated by its controversial “nine-dash line,” which directly conflicts with Vietnam’s claims over various archipelagos and exclusive economic zones. The presence of Chinese oil rigs, such as the famous Haiyang Shiyou 981 in 2014, has sparked mass protests in Vietnam and clashes between vessels of both countries.
In 2025, tensions have not decreased. In recent months, Hanoi has vigorously protested Chinese military maneuvers in the Gulf of Tonkin, as well as incidents involving the Chinese coast guard near the Sandy Cay reefs in the disputed Spratly Islands. At the same time, China has criticized Vietnam’s growing ties with the United States and its participation in multilateral naval exercises. This context gives a tone of strategic ambiguity to the current exercises in Guangxi: while they show a willingness to cooperate, they also reflect ongoing mutual vigilance.
Exercises in Guangxi: a strategic decision
The exercises in Guangxi have been officially presented by both governments as an operation “focused on humanitarian missions, border coordination, and disaster response.” The agenda includes medical training, tactical evacuations, and rescue drills in mountainous terrain, although international observers point out that this type of exercise also improves tactical interoperability and command communication between the armed forces of both countries. For China, it also represents an opportunity to show regional leadership in non-traditional security.
In addition, these exercises are framed within the strategic regional connectivity project promoted by Beijing: the “Two Corridors, One Economic Circle” initiative, which links southern China with northern Vietnam through logistics infrastructure, trade, and political cooperation. Guangxi is a key piece in this scheme, functioning as a bridge between both countries. The development of joint military maneuvers there could be interpreted as an attempt to secure the operational environment for these corridors, reducing the risk of border incidents and generating operational trust.
To conclude, it should be noted that these exercises should not be read solely as a response to external or internal challenges, but as a significant step in the construction of a “shared security community” between both countries. Without forgetting that they have had clashes of interest in the past, and since trust was lost after the 1979 incident, what Beijing seeks is to restore it. And if analyzed a bit more deeply, these exercises could set a precedent for more structured military cooperation mechanisms within Southeast Asia, especially in areas where territorial disputes are sensitive.
*Images for illustrative purposes
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