The steps Argentina should take to equip its Navy, make it operational, and consolidate its position as a key player in the South Atlantic are directly linked to budgetary constraints, structural problems, and the need for long-term planning. In this context, naval modernization, and particularly the modernization of submarines, depends not only on acquiring weapons systems but also on the comprehensive reconstruction of operational, logistical, and human capabilities.
Currently, Argentina’s defense budget remains below 1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), significantly limiting any re-equipment process. This level of investment restricts both the acquisition of new assets and the maintenance of existing ones, creating a gap between the capabilities the country should have and those available for operations in the South Atlantic.
Added to this scenario are structural factors affecting the functioning of the Armed Forces, including the deterioration of the military healthcare system and low salary levels. These conditions impact the retention of qualified personnel and the continuity of specialized technical staff, directly affecting the operational readiness of complex naval units.
Given this situation, the first step must be the restructuring of the defense system as a whole. This implies not only a progressive increase in the budget to levels close to 1.5% of GDP, but also the reorganization of logistics, maintenance, and the readiness structure—elements considered essential to guaranteeing the actual availability of naval assets. In other words, with a greater amount of resources from the national budget, it is not enough for the Argentine Republic to obtain a modern, up-to-date Navy with the capacity to operate in the vast Argentine sea; rather, it is also necessary to reorganize how those resources are distributed, both to solve the current, critical and urgent problems, and to be able to think about future objectives.
In a second phase, the focus shifts to the recovery of critical capabilities, especially in the maritime domain. At this point, the acquisition of conventional attack submarines (SSKs) emerges as a strategic priority, due to their deterrent and maritime control capabilities in the South Atlantic.
Conventionally powered submarines represent a viable option in technical and financial terms, although they require medium-term planning. The estimated timeframe for their acquisition ranges from five to eight years from the political decision, considering negotiation, construction, crew training, and operational integration processes. For example, the F-16 AM/BM for the Argentine Air Force was initiated with the political will in 2024, and only at the end of 2025 were 6 of the 24 units purchased from Denmark incorporated into the Air Force. However, they are not yet operational because the pilots and technicians who will perform the corresponding maintenance on these systems must be trained.
Now, does Argentina need attack submarines? The answer is: Yes. The Argentine Navy currently has two attack submarines: the ARA Santa Cruz, which is inactive because its repair program was canceled; and the ARA Salta, which is only used for dockside training. This means that since the tragedy of the ARA San Juan in 2017, Argentina has no real submarine capabilities.
Alongside the submarine component, another key aspect to consider is the strengthening of maritime surveillance. This includes expanding the fleet of ocean patrol vessels, utilizing unmanned systems, and consolidating radar networks, with the aim of improving control of the Exclusive Economic Zone and addressing issues such as illegal fishing.
The development of air defense and anti-ship missile capabilities is also part of the measures aimed at denying access (that is, having the capacity to effectively and decisively prevent an adversary from entering an area considered strategic by Argentina). These systems increase the operating costs for potential adversaries and contribute to the protection of critical infrastructure and strategic maritime routes.
In this regard, Argentina must understand that it currently faces a potential conflict with a second-tier power, the United Kingdom. The British maintain the largest military base in the entire Southern Hemisphere right in Argentine waters. On Soledad Island lies Mount Pleasant Air Base, and just a few kilometers away is the deep-water military port of Mare Harbour. Does this suggest that the conflict over the archipelago should be resolved militarily? Absolutely not. Furthermore, this is prohibited by the first transitional provision of the Argentine National Constitution, which states, “The recovery of said territories and the full exercise of sovereignty, respecting the way of life of their inhabitants, and in accordance with the principles of international law, constitute a permanent and inalienable objective of the Argentine people.” What this analysis conveys is that Argentina must rebuild its Armed Forces to have deterrent capabilities, as stipulated in Article Two of the National Defense Law.
On the other hand, the possibility of moving towards more complex systems, such as nuclear-powered submarines, is presented as a very long-term alternative. This type of development requires an industrial, technological, and doctrinal base that currently only a small number of countries possess, including the US, China, Russia, the UK, and France.
We must remember that there are two main types of submarines: attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines. While the former are designed to attack ships and protect a Carrier Strike Group, the latter are intended for nuclear deterrence, specifically by launching intercontinental ballistic missiles that can carry nuclear warheads. Some examples of the latter are the US Ohio-class, the Russian Borei-class, and the UK’s Vanguard-class (which will be replaced by the new Dreadnought-class starting in 2030).
Considering what was mentioned in the previous paragraph, we might ask ourselves: Would it be viable for Argentina to acquire nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to guarantee the strategic deterrence mentioned in Article Two of the National Defense Law? Unlike conventionally powered attack submarines, this type of weapons system involves a development or acquisition that is conditioned by international commitments undertaken by Argentina. Among these are the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Missile Technology Control Regime, which limit the proliferation of these systems and regulate their technology transfer.
In addition to these regulatory restrictions, the costs associated with ballistic missile programs or nuclear capabilities involve large-scale investments and lengthy development times. For reference, a U.S. Navy Ohio-class submarine costs approximately USD 3.64 billion each, not including the cost of its development, maintenance, and the training of sailors and technicians. These factors, coupled with potential diplomatic repercussions, reduce its viability in the short and medium term within Argentina’s strategic framework.
Given all of the above, Argentina’s priority should focus on consolidating conventional submarine capabilities, with an emphasis on maritime space control and the defense of economic interests in the South Atlantic. This means it should acquire approximately four to six attack submarines, with the possibility of future expansion. Now, which one to choose? There are several suppliers and classes, but the most prominent are the French Scorpène class and the German Type 214. This approach allows for the optimization of resources and the generation of deterrent effects without incurring high-risk financial or political commitments.
Ultimately, building a functional and effective Navy depends on the continuity of public policies over time. The sustained implementation of these measures over a period of ten to twenty years is considered a determining factor in achieving operational levels that will allow Argentina to play a relevant role in the South Atlantic.
*Cover image of the three Argentine submarines ARA San Juan, ARA Salta, and ARA Santa Cruz in 2015 during training exercises.
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