With more than five decades in service, the A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft remains a cornerstone of the United States Air Force’s (USAF) close air support capability, even as the Pentagon sought to retire it in fiscal year 2026. The veteran and iconic aircraft in its category has withstood multiple decommissioning attempts, and amid a renewed focus on counter-drone operations and USAF modernization, the U.S. Congress has once again decided to postpone its retirement, keeping the fleet active while demanding a viable replacement plan.
The Air Force’s original intent was to retire the remaining 162 A-10s in 2026, accelerating a drawdown process that had previously extended their service life until the end of the decade. This decision was part of a broader plan to retire 340 aircraft in total, aimed at realigning priorities and avoiding rising costs, alongside the cancellation of programs such as the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft. However, the scale of the proposed drawdown raised concerns among lawmakers, who questioned whether the USAF had alternatives capable of fulfilling the specialized roles of this platform.
Lawmakers’ opposition reflects persistent skepticism about the viability of the proposed replacements for the A-10, as future next-generation combat systems and autonomous platforms continue to face production delays and heightened budgetary scrutiny. For many members of Congress, reducing the fleet without fully functional alternatives in place would jeopardize the close air support mission, a critical capability in low- and mid-intensity conflict scenarios.
Beyond the legislative debate, A-10s continue to demonstrate their operational relevance. During 2025, several of these aircraft were deployed to the Middle East under U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), actively participating in drone interception and neutralization missions, including systems of the Shahed type. Images from these deployments showed kill markings on the fuselages, as well as the employment of weapons such as AGR-20F FALCON rockets and GBU-54 JDAM guided bombs, alongside the primary 30 mm GAU-8 rotary cannon, underscoring their utility in roles requiring persistence and payload capacity.
The A-10’s effectiveness in these missions is explained by its unique design: although slower and less maneuverable than more modern jet attack aircraft, its endurance and payload capacity offer comparative advantages, including lower operating costs. While not envisioned at the time of its design, its ability to counter drone swarms—combined with its core mission of providing close support to ground troops—makes it a valuable tool even in the face of more advanced combat technologies.
Against this backdrop, the Air Force is compelled to rethink its transition strategies, as Congress demands detailed reports on retirement and replacement plans between 2027 and 2029. The decision to extend the A-10’s operational life not only highlights the tension between modernization and current capability, but also underscores the need for a pragmatic approach that preserves critical USAF capabilities while moving toward the future.
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The A-10 is a special airplane. It deserves to fly on for many years.
Transfer the A10 to the U.S. Army. A squadron for every division. The Marine Corp has it’s own organic CAS. Something that can be mirrored in the Army. Relieve the Air Force of the CAS mission all togeather if the A10 is such a burden.
The U S. Army will just be too happy to take over the A-10 warehouse tobe a main support of tgeir ground troops anywhere
BURDEN!! Go ask in battle born Infantryman about its burden! A waste laying miracle from above when it all seemed to be last…..nope, alive to fight another day ,I can tell from the massive Freedom Boner that GAU 30 just gave me
There was a modern invision upgrade that looked really promising. It was a bad idea to even retire then, better to make more and more modern upgrades. A low speed, low level, fighter, with that awesome gun, can really lay down alot of rounds, as side from drones. This is really the modern urban fighter plane needed. Can fly fast than a apache and yet slow enough to do well in a urban, low flying setting. Next future is small 1 man drone like planes. That may only have a top speed of 140 miles per hour and a range of 100 miles and the ability to hover and speeds less then 5 miles per hour, but cheap enough and light enough to carry 50 cal and a few small guidance bombs. I’d rather have 2,000 of these, at 500,000 a piece. Then 2 160 million dollar fighter jets.
The three backbone for the Air Force is. A10,
B52,&Apatch Helicopter.
No if are Butts! !
But spend the most ever for a fighter jet that has hover capability!? A real excellent addition in dog scenarios. Guys,we have those,they’re called helicopters. Or is it the great need to not land on deck like all other aircraft! Most useless and never filled money pit yet
Turn them into large drones….
Skip all that and send in the Marines!
Burdanistic as that B52 Bomber that’s been around just a few more days than others,or that bug bad burden C-130 Ghostrider”Angel of Death “….. Burden? Does this guy even know who,what,military is and the weapons that will never have an Obsolete section for them!
Yeah,Marines work. I mean you know,their claim of glory Montazuma is current and up to date bragging rights
What’s with all the Drone Ranger belief!! The run off signal,I don’t know if you know but signal can be hacked,blocked,etc., rendering this treasure obsolete-An app creation! War is a large of gaining and taking ground,which has to occur with speed and superior fire power.
Thinking loitering munitions who are for slow and stationary targets can lead an assault and take ground with speed and superior fire power. Your quad copper military might insane thought is for those whos understanding of war comes from their television, or they talked to someone once,I think they served(In Supply)
Until the Air Force comes up with an “updated alternative aircraft” – not supersonic & dedicated to CAS – MOVE 100% into the Air National Guard. ANG is attached at hip to Army Guard. They train together, they know each other, so CAS is ALWAYS a priority & the Guard will keep higher readiness, quit the BS about F-35 is ‘almost the same’ in capabilities, & get on with the CAS mission. Congress should make it CLEAR to the zoomheads in the puzzle palace that CAS IS an AF Priority Mission.
The A10 is a unique aircraft that fulfills its mission better than any other airplane.
Instead of retiring the A10 they should expand them. They should commission new aircraft to be built from scratch.
There isn’t a ground troop out there that doesn’t just love the warthog. It has saved countless lives inside the kill box and it gets the job done better & faster than the AH-64s could ever hope to have accomplished went the seconds are crucial. Not to mention the absolute terror it strikes in the hearts and minds of the pajama wearing goat F’krs. For some reason the USAF believes that new is always better, but in this case there just isn’t another weapons platform that can compare to the A10 at CAS. Just like great BBQ, low & slow typically beats hot & fast at this particular ground troop need. There will obviously come a time when the A10 won’t be needed. But until COMPLETELY autonomous weapon platforms are filling the skies in support of troops on the ground; the beautifully violent warthog should remain as our go to for CAS.
They stuffed up big time not redeveloping the F14 which had the longest flight rang and weapons carrying capacity along with the maneuverability for dogfighting.
What warrants retirement is the flawed Key West Agreement, which formally assigned responsibility for fixed-wing close air support (CAS) to the U.S. Air Force, with the U.S. Army’s concurrence. While administratively decisive, this arrangement embedded a long-term doctrinal mismatch between mission requirements and institutional priorities.
Historically, the USAF demonstrated sustained resistance to the development of the A-10 and consistently de-emphasized the CAS mission in favor of platforms associated with technological and doctrinal prestige—particularly those optimized for strategic strike, air superiority, and high-altitude operations.
Despite these institutional headwinds, the A-10 has demonstrated exceptional operational effectiveness and survivability, while also achieving a rare degree of political durability—an outcome that reflects both its battlefield utility and the persistent demand for dedicated CAS capabilities.