The President of the United States announced in a post on his social network the instruction to resume “nuclear tests” after more than three decades without detonations. The announcement comes in a context of accelerating military capabilities by Russia and China, and takes place while the international legal framework includes the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), whose verification regime and obligations of the State Parties are detailed and binding for those who have ratified it — a step Washington has not taken.
The president’s public communication was released on his account and contains an explicit statement on nuclear testing: “The U.S. possesses more nuclear weapons than any other country. This was achieved, including a full modernization and renewal of the existing arsenal, during my first term. Due to their tremendous destructive power, it was very difficult for me to do so, but I had no other choice! Russia ranks second, and China a distant third, but the situation will equalize in five years. Due to the testing programs of other countries, I have instructed the Department of War to begin testing our nuclear weapons on equal terms. This process will begin immediately. Thank you for your attention! PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP.”
The presidential communication implies, in practical terms, the lifting of a de facto policy that had been maintained since 1992 (when the last U.S. detonation was recorded) and the moratorium that followed in the context of the end of the Cold War. This shift has immediate effects on strategic perception and on the diplomatic and legal mechanisms governing nuclear testing.
The international legal framework: the CTBT and its verification obligations
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted by the General Assembly in 1996, establishes in its Article 1 a clear and general obligation: “Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.” The instrument also creates the Treaty Organization and an International Monitoring System, with an International Data Center and the possibility of on-site inspections, consultations, and other verification measures.
A key point of the CTBT is that although it was opened for signature in 1996, its entry into force is linked to ratification by certain States listed in Annex II, and the U.S. has never ratified it; until those requirements for full entry into force are met, the implementation of all regime capabilities depends on provisional agreements and arrangements. Even so, the obligations assumed by States Parties through signature and ratification are clear, and the verification architecture operates largely even in preparatory phases.
The strained relationship with China
The announcement occurs within a dual framework, since, on one hand, this week a meeting was held between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping to unlock the “trade war,” with the excessive tariffs imposed by both sides. Donald Trump said he had a “fantastic meeting” with the Chinese head of state: “From zero to ten, ten being the best, I’d say the meeting was a twelve,” said the American to the press once he had already left the Asian country. “Many decisions were made… and we reached conclusions on very important matters.”
Where this situation of understanding is far from the prevailing tensions in Southeast Asia. On one hand, spending and deployment statistics show that global military expenditure reached record levels in 2025 (above US$2.7 trillion), with China and the U.S. concentrating almost half of that spending. The Chinese navy already operates more main combat units (according to IISS, more than 370 ships), and its civilian shipbuilding industry provides scale and production capacity. However, the comparison is not only numerical: the U.S. retains advantages in total tonnage, fifth-generation carrier-based aviation, and nuclear aircraft carriers — 11 versus 3 (though there are indications that Beijing may be starting construction of a fourth carrier) — in addition to a global network of bases and alliances extending its operational reach. Experts from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) emphasize that “U.S. maritime power is defined less by the number of hulls than by the coalition architecture it can activate in times of crisis.”
On the other hand, China shows advantages in construction and repair capacity, with more than 40% of the global commercial shipbuilding market also shifting into the military sphere. The U.S. Department of War has acknowledged bottlenecks in U.S. naval industries related to labor and suppliers; the emerging hypothesis is that China’s numerical superiority could, if translated into operational sustainment and constant presence, erode U.S. freedom of action in regional theaters without an adequate industrial response at home.
Even so, the United States maintains leadership in R&D, electronic warfare, ISR, and capability integration, as well as a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines that constitute its main underwater strategic asset. The challenge noted by analysts is to convert technological and financial advantage into industrial productivity to prevent the difference in the number of ships from becoming a strategic gap. In short, the relative weakness of industrial muscle and the acceleration of Chinese capabilities form a backdrop that, according to the presidential narrative, would justify actions aimed at preserving strategic superiority — including the potential resumption of nuclear testing.
Tensions with Russia
The dynamic with Russia adds another essential element to understanding the announced decision. The first and fundamental factor is that Russian leadership is determined to prolong and consolidate military efforts in Ukraine. This hardening reduces the likelihood of immediate arms limitation agreements and contributes to a sustained perception of threat.
At the same time, in recent days Russia reported a test related to its “Poseidon” torpedo, which Russian authorities and military officials described in terms of lethal capability and novel development. The released material includes the quote: “The power of the Poseidon significantly exceeds even the might of our most promising intercontinental missile, Sarmat,” said the president, referring to the RS-28, also known as SATAN II.
Lastly, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov commented on the nature of the test of the system that would carry the nuclear payload, emphasizing: “We hope the information has been correctly conveyed to President Trump. This cannot in any way be interpreted as a nuclear test.” That clarification matters because it distinguishes between tests of the delivery system and detonations involving an actual nuclear charge.
The exchange of announcements and counter-announcements, together with intelligence reports suggesting Russia’s intent to sustain offensive operations, contributes to an atmosphere in which Washington perceives risks of deterrence erosion and, therefore, responds with measures intended to restore or secure comparative advantages.
Conclusion
The presidential announcement about the resumption of nuclear testing — which literally and publicly was formulated as an instruction to the Department of War to begin tests “immediately” — represents a turning point in the non-detonation policy of the last three decades. The measure fits within a perception of accelerated strategic competition with China and a climate of sustained confrontation with Russia, including public technical developments by Moscow.
From the perspective of international law, the CTBT establishes prohibitions and a robust verification regime that, if fully in force among the relevant parties, would collide with any nuclear detonation. In practice, the political, technical, and diplomatic feasibility of resuming tests will depend on the ability of governments to sustain the initiative in the face of international detection, the pressure of allies and adversaries, and the impact on global strategic stability.
*Images for illustrative purposes only.
*Original text written in Spanish by Germán Alejandro Romero
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