As part of a state policy aimed at consolidating Brazil’s technological sovereignty and maritime projection in the South Atlantic, the development of the nuclear submarine SN Álvaro Alberto represents one of the most ambitious and long-lasting undertakings in the history of the Navy. Framed within the Navy Nuclear Program (PNM) and the Submarine Development Program (PROSUB), this project combines the pursuit of mastering the nuclear fuel cycle with the construction of a naval propulsion plant — two pillars that sustain Brazil’s aspiration to join the select group of nations with nuclear maritime propulsion capability.
The PNM, conceived in 1979, symbolizes a long-term policy in which defense, scientific development, and technological independence converge. Structured around two main axes — the complete mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle and the creation of a naval propulsion plant — the program transcends the military sphere to become a strategic bet on national industrial development and the consolidation of the so-called Blue Amazon, the vast and rich maritime area under Brazilian jurisdiction. The future SN Álvaro Alberto, the country’s first nuclear submarine, will be the ultimate expression of that vision.
Since its inception, the program has gone through cycles of expansion and stagnation, determined both by the domestic political context and by the ups and downs of the national economy. During the 1980s, the combination of a favorable geopolitical environment and strategic consensus on the need for deterrence enabled significant progress, culminating in 1988 with the mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle. However, the end of the Cold War and the reorientation of national priorities toward social and economic issues in the 1990s led to a drastic reduction in allocated resources.
The signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1998 marked a turning point, imposing new restrictions and limiting investments in the area. The program survived thanks to the institutional effort of the Navy, which kept research alive under adverse conditions. Only in 2008, with the National Defense Strategy (END) and the launch of PROSUB, did the subject return to the political agenda, revitalizing international cooperation with France and initiating the construction of a modern industrial base in Itaguaí, Rio de Janeiro State.
PROSUB envisions the local production of four conventional Riachuelo-class submarines, derived from the French Scorpène design but adapted to Brazilian needs. Two of them — Riachuelo (S-40) and Humaitá (S-41) — are already in service; Tonelero (S-42) is progressing through sea trials, while Almirante Karam (S-43) is nearing completion. Nevertheless, the core of the program lies in the development of the nuclear submarine SN Álvaro Alberto (SN-10), whose experimental reactor and initial naval steel sections are currently under construction, with delivery expected around 2034.
The challenge of sustaining a state policy over five decades
Despite official recognition, the implementation of the PNM and PROSUB faces a persistent obstacle: the discontinuity of funding. Between 2015 and 2025, political vicissitudes and fiscal constraints compromised budget predictability, affecting investment timelines. Thus, the gap between political rhetoric and financial reality reflects the absence of a state consensus preventing these programs from being consolidated as permanent policies, subject to multi-year planning rather than administrative fluctuations.
Added to budget instability are the difficulties in generating broad social consensus. The limited public understanding of the relevance of national defense has resulted in fragmented support, often vulnerable to short-term debates or misinformation campaigns. Brazilian society, traditionally focused on immediate social issues, has not developed a solid awareness of the risks associated with the loss of maritime sovereignty. Consequently, strategic projects such as the nuclear submarine still lack the sustained public backing their magnitude demands.
The risk of interruption of strategic programs goes beyond technical aspects. Without a legal framework guaranteeing budgetary continuity and effective mechanisms to retain specialized personnel, both the PNM and the SNCA are exposed to the loss of human capital and accumulated knowledge. This scenario could jeopardize decades of progress and weaken Brazil’s position as an emerging power in defense and peaceful nuclear technology.
In this context, it is essential to establish a coherent National Security Strategy, with mechanisms linking defense policy, budgetary planning, and development goals. Documents such as the National Defense Policy (PND) and the National Defense Strategy (END) require periodic updates and effective coordination with public management instruments, to ensure that programs like the PNM and PROSUB depend not on circumstantial will, but on institutional state commitments.
The Brazilian nuclear submarine, more than a weapon system with high deterrent power, embodies a state policy designed to project sovereignty, knowledge, and industrial capability. Its success will depend on the country’s ability to maintain stable investment, strengthen its defense culture, and understand that technological development and national security are complementary dimensions of the same strategy. Turning the PNM and PROSUB into structural and permanent programs will not only guarantee Brazil’s strategic autonomy but also its international projection as a modern and technologically sovereign maritime power.
*Images used for illustrative purposes.
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What a load of nonsense. Brazil has a GDP per person of $10k, significantly less than Mexico & Argentina. Brazil has no real genuine need of a nuclear submarine, it’s a regional power at best, wasting billions on a nuclear sub is just willy waving. Brazil has real issues to deal with in the form of poverty, racism, corruption at all levels.
For all the talk of Brazil starting to turn itself into a economy success story, it’s worth remembering 59 million Brazilians live below the poverty line. Healthcare is lamentable, education is below standard for millions in Brazil. For such a nation to be working upon nuclear submarine propulsion is beyond belief. Only the US, Russia, UK, France & more recently India built and used nuclear subs. Brazil are very, very many years from having their own, and it’s not a major problem. Modern German subs are said to be quieter than nuclear attack subs, and a hell of a lot cheaper at around $400m each. For each nuclear sub, Brazil could buy around 6 German subs.